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Abstract 
 Generic drug approval cases involving Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations are adjudicated at the Federal Court through the judicial review 
process.  The European Union alleges that this abbreviated process is unfair to litigants 
who hold patents on medicines, since it does not encompass all of the features of a trial, 
nor is it an actual suit for patent infringement.  In addition, the process has unequal 
appeal rights for the patent holder and the patent challenger, where the generic challenger 
can appeal a decision at Federal Court, but the patent holder cannot.     
 When examining the pattern of decision making in Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations cases at the Supreme Court of Canada, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the Supreme Court Justices are making wrong or unfair decisions because 
the lower court cases were decided through the judicial review process.  The decision 
making pattern is very similar to the pattern in the Supreme Court patent cases, and to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence overall, so there is little reason to think that wrong 
decisions on these cases are being made because of the abbreviated process.  In addition, 
the pattern of decision making in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is 
much different than the Supreme Court jurisprudence on copyright, an area of law that 
has been through a period of significant change due to issues surrounding digital music.  
The copyright cases are quite comparable to the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases, in that the original adjudication of both case types was through the 
process of judicial review.  However, the decision making pattern in the copyright cases 
contrasts the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, in that there 
are few concurring opinions in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and 
a high proportion of concurring opinions in the copyright cases, which indicates that the 
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interpretation of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is not 
creating divided opinions amongst the Justices, nor is the abbreviated process of judicial 
review from the lower court contributing to significant judicial disagreement.  This study 
therefore provides evidence that a full trial for patent infringement in these cases would 
not necessarily change the outcomes in these cases.   
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Chapter One: An Overview of the Study 
 Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations1 were 
implemented in 1993 to balance two objectives: protect patents to induce brand name 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in research and development in Canada, and to 
expedite the approval of generic copies of drugs that had lost patent protection.  Patent 
terms had to be protected by preventing the launch of generic copies of brand name drugs 
before their patents expired. In some instances a generic company would simply infringe 
on the patent holder’s rights, since the penalties incurred from infringement were 
significantly smaller than the profits.  At the same time, the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulations were supposed to expedite the approval process for generic 
medications by preventing unnecessary delays brought about by clever patenting 
strategies by the patent holder.2  Expediting the approval of generics is an important 
measure in containing health care costs.  As generics are significantly less expensive than 
their brand name counterparts, it is prudent to have them available as soon as the patents 
on the innovative product have expired.   
Before the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations came into 
existence, generic manufacturers seeking approval to manufacture and sell copies of 
brand name drugs in Canada were required to undergo the same extensive safety and 
efficacy testing as brand name pharmaceuticals.  In accord with new commitments under 
                                                          
1 SOR/93-133 [PM(NOC), or PM(NOC) Regulations, or “the Regulations”].   
2 This could include adding patents that were not necessarily related to the drug product in question, or 
evergreening patents to extend patent life.  Evergreening is the process of adding successive patents onto an 
existing patent to block the copying of a medicine when the initial patents expire.  This was addressed in 
the amendments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in 2006, S 5(4)(a) and (b), 
which freeze the patent register for a novel drug once marketing approval of that drug is granted.   
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the North American Free Trade Agreement3 and the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,4 Canada simplified 
its procedures for approving generics, allowing generic manufacturers to rely on the 
research and clinical and safety studies submitted for approval of the corresponding 
branded pharmaceuticals.   
Over the course of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations’ 
twenty-one year life span (1993 to 2016), several issues have arisen over their fairness to 
the litigants in a proceedings related to the approval process of a new generic drug.  For 
one, litigation arising from the generic drug approval process operates by way of a 
summary process called judicial review, which is used to review the applicability of 
certain patents that may be holding up the genericization of a particular branded 
medicine.  Eliminating or curtailing some elements of a full trial, the judicial review 
process concerns Canada’s trading partners, because judges are making decisions about 
the approval of generic drugs on abbreviated information about the patents behind the 
innovative pharmaceutical, and are also deferring a great deal of expertise to Health 
Canada, who can decide to allow generic companies to bypass certain patents.  Although 
Canada argued at a World Trade Organization complaint hearing that the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations simply provide additional protection over 
and above the protection afforded in the Patent Act, the entire process has been viewed 
                                                          
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, T.S. No. 2 (1994), 32. 
I.L.M. 289 (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States; entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1994), [NAFTA]. 
4 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Apr 15, 1994, Oct. 30, 1947, T.S. No. 27 (1947), 
58 U.N.T.S. 187, (negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade 
Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]).  Canada signed the TRIPS Agreement 
in 1994, and it was in force at the beginning of 1995.  TRIPS is administered by the World Trade 
Organization.  It establishes standards for the protection of intellectual property for World Trade 
Organization members. 
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by the European Union and its member states as an opportunity for the generic 
manufacturer to overturn patents and accelerate development times, simply because the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations operate under a legal backdrop 
that does not encompass a complete dispute mechanism that adjudicates the validity of 
the patents themselves.5   
The judicial review process that emanates from the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations has also been criticized6 for having unbalanced appeal rights, 
where the innovator is without an appeal at the moment a judge rules in favor of the 
generic manufacturer, since generic approval is granted immediately following an 
unsuccessful challenge by the patent holder to stop that approval.7  Regulations within 
North American Free Trade Agreement, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Agreement, and the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement8 require that signatory countries provide brand and generic pharmaceutical 
companies equal appeal rights after a trial court decision, but the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations do not allow for effective appeals, since a generic 
                                                          
5 World Trade Organization, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, A Complaint by the 
European Communities and their Member States, Report of the Panel, March 17, 2000, WT/DS114/R.  
This complaint will be discussed in detail later in Chapter Four, on page 56. 
6 Suzanne Porter, “Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: Removing 
Inefficiencies to Encourage Generic Competition” (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 
2011).  Suzanne Porter is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Toronto.  Her master’s thesis 
compared Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations to the United States’ Hatch-
Waxman Act, and concluded that the Canadian regulations could be made fair if the Regulations were 
amended to include a direct patent infringement suit when evaluating any patents under the generic 
medicines approval process, where the process would provide both litigants with equal appeal rights. 
7 Supra note 1, S. 7(2)(b).  If the court declares that the patents are not valid, or that the patents will not be 
infringed, there is no longer a reason to hold up the approval of a generic drug, and the Notice of 
Compliance is issued, in accordance with S. 7(1)(e).  
8 The text of the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) was 
finalized on September 26, 2014 and is currently awaiting ratification.  The finalized text can be found at 
www.international.gc.ca/CETA.  The provision for equal appeal rights is found in S 9 bis of CETA, Article 
1709 of NAFTA, and Article 27 of TRIPS.  Appeal rights are discussed in Chapter Four page 63.   
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company must be granted approval for its product if an initial challenge by a brand 
manufacturer is dismissed.   
The legal burden of proof in judicial reviews over generic approval has been 
criticized as being unfair,9 since it falls on the innovator company to defend its patents, 
even though it has already established patent protection for its pharmaceutical under the 
Patent Act.10  Since the generic applicant can allege that the patents are invalid or 
inapplicable to the drug product in question, the patent holder becomes responsible for 
defending its previously issued patents, and if it does not do so, the Minister of Health 
will order a Notice of Compliance to approve the generic drug for manufacture and sale 
in Canada.11   
The standard of review in these judicial review proceedings is the reasonableness 
of the Minister of Health in deciding to list or de-list a patent on the Patent Register, and 
not a determination of the correct patent status for the patents involved.  For decisions 
made by government tribunals that are judicially reviewed, the question for the judge 
therefore becomes whether or not that government minister acted reasonably, and not 
whether he acted correctly.  The standard of review of reasonableness goes hand in hand 
with the mechanism of judicial review to expedite decision making in these cases, where 
technical or scientific expertise is involved.  With significant deference given to Health 
Canada’s expertise in pharmaceuticals, there is concern amongst members of the 
                                                          
9 Supra note 6.   
10 Frederick Rein and Patrick Smith.  “A Discussion of Generic Drug Approval and Patent Systems in the 
United States and Canada.” (2009) 25 CIPR 83 at 92.   
11 Supra note 1, S. 7(2)(b).   
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European Union that the rights afforded to patent holders do not encompass the full 
protection guaranteed to them under the Patent Act.12 
In an attempt to reduce potential uncertainty vis-à-vis judicial review, specific 
adjustments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could make 
them similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act13 in the United States, which employs a full 
action for infringement, complete with discovery, the adjudication of patent validity to a 
standard of correctness, and the opportunity to appeal14 that automatically comes into 
play in the generic medicine approval process.  When a generic manufacturer alleges that 
a patent on a drug is invalid or not applicable, that generic manufacturer is automatically 
deemed to have infringed on the patent, establishing a cause of action under the United 
States Patents Act.15  Whether or not replacing the judicial review process with an action 
for infringement is correct depends on the nature of the issues associated with the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, and whether the Supreme Court 
Justices are having significant disagreement16 because of the abbreviated nature of the 
judicial review process in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases that have 
been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.   This paper will demonstrate that 
there is insufficient evidence that the process of judicial review is creating increased 
disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices; without a high level of disagreement 
                                                          
12 Porter, supra note 6 at 42.   
13 The Hatch-Waxman Act is also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. 
Its abbreviated name is from its sponsors, Republican senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Congressman 
Henry Waxman.  The Act is incorporated into The Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, 21 USC 
§355(j).   
14 Supra note 6 at 43.   
15 35 USC (2006).   
16 A case where there is significant disagreement among the Justices may be decided differently in the 
presence of additional evidence, which would be the case if the cases were decided by way of an action 
rather than judicial review.  This situation will be referred to as “difficulty” in various places throughout 
this thesis.   
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amongst the Justices, there is little evidence to support claims that these cases cannot be 
adjudicated properly through the judicial review process.  This will therefore guide future 
research on how the Regulations should be amended, if at all.     
By building a profile of the types of decisions made in the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme Court and comparing that profile to other 
decision making patterns available from other studies, conclusions can be drawn as to 
whether there is evidence of significant disagreement and improper decision making.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine if judicial review is really problematic 
in these cases, and it will help to determine if adjustments to the Regulations are 
necessary for respecting Canada’s agreements in international trade.17   
The Central Investigations of the Thesis 
First, the decision making pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Supreme Court cases will be compared to the general patent cases at the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  A similar pattern suggests that Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases are decided correctly, and that the Justices had no more difficulty in 
reaching a decision in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than in the 
patent cases generally.  This qualitative comparison will be combined with a qualitative 
examination of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme 
Court to see which cases have significant patent adjudication issues.  This qualitative 
comparison will also offer insight as to whether the cases are primarily about patent 
                                                          
17 A study of the decision making patterns in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the 
Federal Court could also be undertaken, but there are over one thousand cases to be researched.  In 
addition, there are no decision making studies at the Federal Court level that can be used for comparison.  
The Supreme Court cases allow each litigant one hour to present an argument.  The arguments are based on 
the evidence, law, and adjudication made at the Federal Court of Appeal, so the decisions at the Supreme 
Court are related to what has been presented at the lower court.  See Future Research in Chapter Seven, p 
114.   
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infringement, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, or the judicial 
review process itself.   
The second task will be to determine whether or not the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Supreme Court cases have a decision making profile that is 
similar to the Supreme Court copyright cases analyzed in Professor Margaret Ann 
Wilkinson’s pentalogy article, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in 
The Copyright Pentalogy.18  If there is the same proportion of unanimous decisions, 
majority decisions with concurring reasons, and solo dissents in patent infringement and 
invalidity cases as in the Supreme Court of Canada copyright decisions, then there is 
some evidence that the administrative component, the process of judicial review, is itself 
problematic, and further academic investigation into this process would be warranted.   
The third research task will be to determine whether the Supreme Court decisions 
on the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases fit into the general pattern of 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which covers all disciplines of law.  The study 
data will be compared to the pattern of unanimous, majority decisions with concurring 
reasons, dissent, and solo dissents in Supreme Court jurisprudence studies.  This question 
is extends from the data collection required to investigate the comparison to copyright, 
since Wilkinson’s article compared the copyright cases to the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court data provides an additional pattern of decision 
making that can be compared the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.   
                                                          
18 Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in The Copyright 
Pentalogy, How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Copyright Law, ed. Michael Geist 
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) 71-92.  Wilkinson is jointly appointed to the Faculty of Law 
and the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at the University of Western Ontario.  She holds a law 
degree from the University of Toronto, a Bachelor of Arts degree (University of Toronto), a masters of 
legal studies (University of Toronto), and a Doctor of Philosophy degree (University of Western Ontario).   
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If the decision making patterns are similar to the Supreme Court patent cases or 
the general Supreme Court cases, it suggests that the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases are adjudicated in a similar fashion to full actions, indicating that the 
process of judicial review is not causing more disagreement among the Justices than in 
any other cases.   If there is no more disagreement among the Justices in the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than the general Supreme Court cases or the 
Supreme Court patent cases, then research on the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations should focus on aspects other than the judicial review process.  
The results provide relevant information about the effect of the abbreviated process of 
judicial review to the specific complaint brought forward by the European Union about 
Canada’s obligations under TRIPS.   
A Hypothesis: Judicial Review is “Enough” Process 
  The Comparison of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases 
to the Supreme Court Patent Cases and the General Supreme Court Cases 
 Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law provides a framework for understanding 
why judicial review provides enough process for adjudicating disputes arising from the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  Ronald Dworkin was the 
pioneer of the “right answer” theory of the law,19 asserting that the role of judges is to use 
their extraordinary abilities to understand the law, then apply it to a fact situation to 
determine the “right” answer in a case.  Dworkin believes that there is a single right 
answer to every case.   
                                                          
19 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.    
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 Dworkin does not believe that the law can be accurately encompassed in a theory 
that just describes the law as a scientific principle to which people adhere to by nature.  
Descriptive or “natural” models of the law describe an objective morality of the law, 
which is not created by human beings, but is discovered by them, as one could discover a 
law of physics: “Moral reasoning or philosophy is a process of reconstructing the 
fundamental principles by assembling concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural 
historian reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones that 
he has found.”20  Dworkin’s theory, however, is constructive, in that it “treats institutions 
of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but rather as stipulated 
features of a general theory to be constructed, as if the sculptor set himself to carve the 
animal that best fits a pile of bones he happened to find together.”21  In other words, the 
judge, as an architect, takes existing judgments and legislation, and assembles them in the 
right order to administer the law.   
 This ‘constructive’ model does not assume, as the natural model does, that  
 principles of justice have some fixed, objective existence, so that descriptions of 
 these principles must be true or false in some standard way.  It does not assume  
 that the animal it matches to the bones actually exists.  It makes the different, and  
 in some ways more complex, assumption that men and women have a 
 responsibility to fit the particular judgments on which they act into a coherent 
 program or action, or, at least, that officials who exercise power over other men 
 have that sort of responsibility.22 
  
 Dworkin reinforces his constructive model by stating that it is somewhat creative, 
but clarifies that it does not require inventing justice, but involves interpretation: 
 The justification need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, but it 
 must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting that 
 practice, not inventing a new one.23 
                                                          
20 Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position” (1973) U Chi L Rev 40, 500.   
21 Supra note 19 at 160.   
22 Supra note 19 at 160.   
23 Ronald Dworkin, “Law’s Empire” (1986) Harvard UP, 66.   
10 
 
 
 
In other words, law requires “constructive interpretation,” where law is not a natural 
concept  (that would emanate from a supreme being, for example, and be “natural” to 
follow), but requires “imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the 
best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”24   Imparting 
constructive interpretation means that Dworkin’s model is therefore argumentative in 
nature: “constructive interpretations… try to show legal practice as a whole in its best 
light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best 
justification of that practice.”25   
 Dworkin delineates three stages of constructive interpretation: 
 First, there must be a “preinterpretive” stage in which the rules and standards  
 taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are identified….  Second,  
 there must be an interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general 
 justification for the main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive 
 stage….  Finally, there must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which he  
 adjusts his sense of what the practice “really” requires so as better to serve the 
 justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.26  
  
The three stages serve to form the basis of interpretation.  A judge would gather the 
relevant cases and legislation required, then interpret the facts with respect to the cases 
and legislation, then reflect upon that decision and how it fits into the existing 
jurisprudence.   
 Dworkin also asserts that the interpretive attitude required in law requires value 
judgments.  He affirmed that  
 …propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal history, in a   
 straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from  
                                                          
24 Ibid at 52.   
25 Supra note 23 at 55.   
26 Supra note 23 at 65.   
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 legal history.  They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of 
 both description and evaluation but is different from both.27 
 
Using the rules of courtesy as an example, Dworkin explains that the interpretive attitude 
requires an assumption that it has an objective value (or a purpose) and a further 
assumption that the interpretive attitude is sensitive to that value.   
 The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but 
 has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle – in 
 short, that it has some point – that can be stated independently of just describing 
 the rules that make up the practice.  The second is the further assumption that the 
 requirements of courtesy – the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants – are 
 not necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are 
 instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied 
 or extended or modified or qualified or limited by that point.  Once this 
 interpretive attitude takes hold, the institution of courtesy ceases to be 
 mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a runic order.  People now try 
 to impose meaning on the institution – to see its best light – and then to 
 restructure it in the light of that meaning.28 
 
It is clear that Dworkin is endorsing a moral reading of the practice of law - law and 
morality are part of the same system.  He argues that the concept of values is integrated 
into law, stating that “[i]t would make little sense to treat the political values… as 
detached values.”29  He extends this integration of law and morality by avowing that a 
theory of the law 
 Must find the place of each value in a larger and mutually supporting web of  
 conviction that displays supporting connections among moral and political values 
 generally and then places these in the still larger context of ethics.30 
 
This does not mean that all judges will come to the same answer, as that would imply that 
there is a consensus as to what is ‘right.’  Rather, there is a right answer for a particular 
                                                          
27 Ronald Dworkin, “How Law is Like Literature” in A Matter of Principle (1985) Harvard UP at 147.   
28 Supra note 23 at 47.   
29 Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy” in Justice in Robes (2006) 
Harvard UP, at 158.   
30 Ibid at 168.   
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judge who applies his own principles correctly to the legal question at hand.  A particular 
case may be difficult to judge, but it is the analysis of the judge, based on his upbringing, 
character, and education, that allows him to properly interpret the law, making his answer 
right, regardless of which side of the law the decision falls.   
 Considering Dworkin’s one right answer thesis, framed within his principles of 
constructive interpretation of the law, integration of values into the law, and evaluation of 
legal history, a judge can solve a hard case by interpreting and applying existing law, and 
evaluating that outcome within the frame of reference of the law and his own sense of 
morality, which is infused into the law.  By applying this formula, there is no new law 
created, but rather an application of existing law, with a legal and moral argument 
underpinning it, and one right answer is the result.  To test his theory against difficult 
legal cases (where deciding the case in favour of one litigant over another is not easy), 
Dworkin created imaginary Judge Hercules:  
 [A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call 
 Hercules… a judge in some representative American jurisdiction… [who] accepts 
 the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his 
 jurisdiction… that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish 
 legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of 
 their court or higher courts whose rationale… extends to the case at bar.31 
   
This is consistent with Dworkin’s position in Justice for Hedgehogs, where he explains 
how judges reach a decision in difficult cases by distinguishing between indeterminacy 
and uncertainty: 
 But in all these aspects indeterminacy differs from uncertainty.  “I am uncertain 
 whether the proposition in question is true or false” is plainly consistent with “It is 
 one or the other,” but “The proposition is neither true nor false” is not.32    
 
                                                          
31 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1974) 88 Harvard L Rev at 1083.   
32 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Harvard UP, at 91.   
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Hercules allows Dworkin to separate indeterminacy from uncertainty, since it would be 
implausible for a judge to come to a conclusion on an indeterminate legal question, but 
realistic to think that there is one right answer to an uncertain legal question that can be 
constructed and interpreted from pre-existing legal materials in difficult cases, evaluated 
from both the underlying legal and moral principles then be integrated into the law.   
 Therefore Judge Hercules, reading factums, and affidavits of witnesses being 
examined and cross-examined in a generic medicine approval case, should be able to 
weave the law of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations into a case 
to reach the right decision, even if the process is not as thorough as an action, simply 
because his background and principles will lead him to the right answer.  To state that 
more process is required means that a judge can do a better job if he just has more 
information, and diminishes the idea that the judge can make the right decision, based on 
his abilities and the information that he does have.  If the process of judicial review is 
insufficient for adjudicating the cases, the process could be leading to uncertainty or 
indeterminacy, but the addition of a partial process, like judicial review, should not create 
indeterminacy, but only serve to remove it.  If there is indeterminacy in the case, it is 
unclear how additional process would ever change that.  Therefore, issues with 
indeterminacy should not be prevalent with Judge Hercules in Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases, but uncertainty could.  If Judge Hercules is left with some 
uncertainty in these cases, Judge Hercules can still make a decision, because of his 
background and his skill at applying the law and his values to the problem.  If there is a 
lot of uncertainty in these cases because of the process, and Judge Hercules is not always 
achieving the one right answer, this will be borne out by a different pattern of decision 
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making in the Supreme Court Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than in 
the Supreme Court patent cases or the Supreme Court general jurisprudence.  I am 
confident that the judicial review process provides enough process for the achievement of 
the one right answer by the Herculean effort of the Supreme Court Justices.   
 Dworkin’s critics33 state that the legal principles held by Judge Hercules may be 
insufficient to solve difficult cases, which could leave him in a dilemma.  In technical 
cases involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, the question 
emerges as to whether the additional process involved in a full action, as opposed to a 
judicial review, would make it any easier for a judge to reach the right decision, or leave 
him in a dilemma.  An analysis of the decision making pattern, and a comparison to the 
pattern of judgments in the Supreme Court patent group or the general Supreme Court 
group will help in this determination, where similar patterns would refute this idea, since 
difficult cases naturally to lead to more judicial disagreement.34  A pattern of decision 
making that is not problematic would be similar to a pattern of decisions in similar cases 
that were adjudicated through a complete action, especially if the cases are somewhat 
related.  If the pattern of decision making in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases is no different than the Supreme Court patent cases, or the general 
Supreme Court cases, and judges will be applying their principles to come up with the 
                                                          
33 Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin, (1992), Stanford UP, 137-147.  At 145, Guest states that “Dworkin’s 
thesis is… a defensive thesis to the criticism that there cannot be right answers in hard cases where there is 
no ‘proof’ or demonstration.” 
34 Disagreement among Justices at the Supreme Court of Canada is discussed by Peter McCormick in 
Chapter Five: Peter McCormick, “Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence at the Modern Supreme Court of 
Canada 1984 to 2006” (2008) 53 McGill LJ 137.  Professor Wilkinson also discusses concurring decisions 
and disagreement at the Supreme Court, which will be discussed in Chapter Five:  Margaret Ann 
Wilkinson, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in The Copyright Pentalogy, How the 
Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Copyright Law, ed. Michael Geist (Ottawa: University 
of Ottawa Press, 2013) 71-92.   
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right answer in any particular case, it lends credence to the idea that the abbreviated 
process at the Federal Court is not creating more disagreement among Justices at the 
Supreme Court.  Innovative pharmaceutical firms are motivated for more process, since 
more process would lead to actual patent infringement actions, live witness testimony, 
and more time where the innovator’s product is in a monopoly position in the 
marketplace.    
 Dworkin’s one right answer hypothesis is not intended to be a holistic theory 
about the law of pharmaceuticals, generic approval, or judicial review.  Rather, its 
constructivist features fit with the assertion that a full patent infringement trial equalizes 
fairness to patent holders in generic drug approval litigation.  Although a full trial may 
provide a judge with a few more “bones” to construct, my assertion is that the judicial 
review process provides enough evidence in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases to make any difference between the two processes.   
   A Hypothesis about the Comparison of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Cases to the Copyright Cases 
 If the pattern of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is dissimilar 
to that of the copyright cases, the analysis does not support the idea that it is the 
abbreviated process of judicial review itself that is problematic in deciding these cases.  
The pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is not likely to be 
similar to the copyright cases, seeing that the copyright cases over the past two decades 
have involved digital rights over music, while the Copyright Modernization Act was not 
passed until 2012.35  There is likely much more dissent and concurring opinions in the 
                                                          
35 SC 2012, c20. 
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copyright cases than the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  A pattern of 
cases that is, instead, similar to the pattern in general Supreme Court jurisprudence 
supports the notion that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are no 
more difficult to decide than other Supreme Court cases.   
Decision Making Patterns as Relative Comparisons 
 The present study uses data from previous decision making patterns to draw 
relative comparisons among the groups of cases.  But previous studies have focused on 
discovering the underlying motivations and beliefs of judges that could be affecting one 
particular group of decisions.  Early studies of decision making attempted to link the 
political ideology and attitudes of judges to their judicial outcomes, but the relative 
comparison in this study alleviates the need to try to postulate about these “hidden” 
factors.   
 The political justifications for judicial attitudes in these previous studies do not 
necessarily align with Dworkin’s one right answer theory.  In accord with Dworkin’s 
theory, a judge, because of his background and his knowledge of the law, should not 
allow political beliefs to sway interpretations of the law.   
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Chapter Two: Methodology for Answering the Central Questions 
 Data Collection 
 The first step in examining the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases 
will be to collate all of the patent cases and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases at the Supreme Court since 1970.  This time period was chosen, since previous 
decision studies on the Supreme Court reach back to the early seventies.  Thirty-one 
patent cases were heard at the Supreme Court during this period, providing an adequate 
number cases for comparison, across several different panels of Justices.  Since the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations received Royal Assent in 1993, 
there have only been six cases that have reached the Supreme Court (Table One).  All six 
are included in the study. 
Table 1: The Six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases 
Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)36   
Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (Attorney General)37  
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health)38 
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc.39  
Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc.40 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc.41 
   
                                                          
36 [1998] 2 SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-Frosst].   
37 [2005] 1 SCR 533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-Myers].   
38 [2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 [Astra-Zeneca]. 
39 [2008] 3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-Synthelabo]. 
40 [2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60 [Teva].   
41 [2015] SCC 20 [Sanofi-Aventis].    
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 The composition of the court (the number of Supreme Court Justices) will be 
recorded, as well as the central issues in each case.  The different categories of decisions 
for the cases will be tabulated: the number of unanimous decisions, the number of 
majority decisions with and without minority concurring reasons and with and without 
dissent.  Dissents will be categorized and tabulated as unanimous,42 non-unanimous 
(multiple dissents),43 and solo.44  The number of each type of judgment will also be 
counted, and the total number of reasons given out over all of the cases will be tabulated 
for comparative purposes.  Case disposition data, defined as the percentage of allowed 
appeals for a given category of cases, will also be tabulated.  The tabulation of data 
comprises the decision making pattern.  
  Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright case data on decision making from the 
Pentalogy study will be referenced in similar format to the patent data.  Wilkinson’s data 
on general Supreme Court decision making patterns, referenced from other authors, will 
also be used, and supplemented with statistical information from the Supreme Court of 
Canada official website.     
 Analysis of the Central Question 
 Once the decisions have been tabulated and the issues have been recorded for the 
patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, a comparative analysis will 
be performed.  To answer the first question, the decision making patterns in the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations cases will be compared to the Supreme 
                                                          
42 Unanimous dissent refers to a dissent agreed upon by more than one justice, where only one set of 
dissenting reasons is provided.   
43 Non-unanimous dissent would involve two or more dissents in a case, and could include multiple 
signatories on each, or two solo dissents, or a dissent with more than one signatory and a solo dissent.   
44 Solo dissents are dissents written by one justice, with no other judges in agreement with the dissent.   
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Court patent cases.  Although decisions in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases may invalidate patents (as in a traditional infringement or impeachment action), 
patenting and generic drug approval become linked, since the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulations invoke challenges to the validity of patents for the purpose 
of getting generic pharmaceuticals approved for sale in the Canadian market.  If the 
comparison distinguishes the two types of cases, it suggests that the different pattern 
reflects different issues in the cases, or differences related to the way the two sets of cases 
are adjudicated.   
 Second, the decision making patterns in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases will be compared to the decision making patterns in Professor 
Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright study.  A similar pattern could indicate that judges 
have similar levels of disagreement with both types of cases, suggesting that the 
predominant issue with the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is more 
administrative than legislative in nature.  As discussed, the administrative issues at play 
would primarily be related to the elements of judicial review and not the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations themselves.  Conversely, differences in 
the decision making patterns of the two sets of cases would not provide evidence of any 
common problem involving the process of judicial review in the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases or the copyright cases.   
 Third, a comparison of decision making patterns will be made with Supreme 
Court cases generally to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  Differing 
patterns could highlight the level of consensus among Supreme Court Justices when 
deciding the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  A low level of consensus 
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would provide evidence that the judicial review process is insufficient for deciding the 
cases.  A high level of consensus suggests that the judicial review process is sufficient.   
 In summary, a comparison of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada to Wilkinson’s copyright case data, Supreme 
Court patent case data, and general Supreme Court decision making data will help 
characterize the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) decisions and point the way 
for future research.  The data from this analysis will help to support or reject the idea that 
the process of judicial review leads to less agreement and potentially more wrong 
outcomes when decisions over the approval of generic medicines are made.  Not only 
will each comparison provide information, but the three comparisons together will also 
help to create an overall picture as to whether or not the use of judicial review in these 
cases is increasing the level of disagreement and potentially incorrect outcomes.     
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Chapter Three: Pharmaceutical Companies, the Drug Approval Process and Patenting in 
Canada 
This chapter will introduce fundamental concepts about generic and innovative 
pharmaceuticals and the pharmaceutical approval process in Canada.  An overview of 
patenting will be provided to draw attention to how the elements of patent apply to 
medicines.  Patent infringement and impeachment, and any ensuing litigation in Canada, 
as it applies to any patent, will also be outlined, as this process is available to holders of 
patents on pharmaceuticals.  In addition, understanding the generic drug approval process 
requires an explanation of the history of compulsory licencing in Canada, and how 
Canada’s international trade obligations led to the elimination of this practice and the 
introduction of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.   
 Generic versus Brand (Innovative) Pharmaceuticals 
 Brand name pharmaceuticals, or innovative pharmaceuticals, are medicines that 
result from primary research and development.  Research for creating new medicines is 
challenging, time-consuming, and expensive.  Developing a new prescription medicine 
that gains market approval costs, on average, $802 million and takes over ten years to 
complete.45  Of these costs, fifty percent is attributed to synthesizing novel molecules 
through complicated chemical processes.46 Compounds that exhibit theoretical promise 
are investigated for safety, followed by efficacy, which means that they must be both safe 
for consumption and useful in treating specific medical conditions.  Safety and efficacy 
                                                          
45 Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen, and Henry Grabowski, “The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs,” (Oct 2002) J Health Econ, at 180.  This figure is provided in year 2000 dollars, 
and represents the out-of-pocket costs for development.  The authors also provide an updated figure of       
$1,395 million, as of 2014, on the Tufts University Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development at 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study.    
46 The research often employs complex computer algorithms that can generate hundreds of thousands of 
compounds which are then screened.  Promising compounds are developed through the synthesis outlined 
in the algorithm.   
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testing, filing for patents, and managing regulatory requirements accounts for the 
remaining fifty percent of the costs, but recent studies have shown that both the time and 
the costs involved in doing clinical trials has increased dramatically in the past ten years 
due to more complex regulatory requirements.  Requirements for more study subjects, 
requirements for longer studies for drugs used for chronic conditions, and difficulty 
recruiting study subjects are among the reasons for the increased time and costs 
associated with clinical trials.47   
 Generic pharmaceuticals are “copies” of brand name pharmaceuticals, which are 
bioequivalent to the branded product.  Bioequivalence means that the concentration of the 
drug in the bloodstream of the generic drug is the same as in the branded (or reference) 
product.  Bioequivalence also requires that the maximum concentration of the generic 
drug in the bloodstream is the same as the maximum concentration in the branded 
product.  For the purposes of bioequivalence, Health Canada defines bioequivalence as: 
a. The 90% confidence interval of the relative mean area under the concentration 
versus time curve to the time of the last quantifiable concentration (AUCT) of the 
test to reference product should be within 80.0% to 125.0% inclusive. 
b. b) The relative mean maximum concentration (Cmax) of the test to reference 
product should be between 80.0% and 125.0% inclusive.48 
 
Generally, part a. means that a generic drug is considered “the same” or “equivalent” if 
the concentration of drug in the bloodstream falls between 80 percent and 125 percent of 
the branded product 90 percent of the time.  Part b. indicates that the maximum 
                                                          
47 Dickson, Michael and Gagnon, Jean Paul, “Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and 
Development” (May, 2004) 3(5): Nature Reviews.  Drug Discovery, 417 at 418.    
48 Health Canada Drugs and Health Products Guidance Document – Comparative Bioavailability Standards: 
Formulations Used for Systemic Effects.  (May 2012), File No. 12-105972-31.  The preamble states that 
“The purpose of these documents is to update and consolidate eleven existing Health Canada documents 
related to the conduct and analysis of comparative bioavailability studies and the standards to be met in 
those studies in order to comply with Sections C.08.002(2)(h), C.08.002.1(2)(c)(ii) and C.08.003(3) of the 
Food and Drug Regulations.”   
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concentration in the bloodstream should be within 80 percent to 125 percent of the 
branded product.   
 These copied medicines are synthesized using the information disclosed in the 
patents registered on brand name pharmaceuticals.  Significantly less research and 
development is required to copy a drug than to bring a new innovative drug to market.  
Consequently, generic pharmaceuticals cost a fraction of what brand name 
pharmaceuticals cost to develop.  It is estimated that the development of a generic drug in 
Canada takes three to six years and costs $4 million to bring the drug to market.49  
Generic pharmaceuticals create savings for provincial governments, which pay or 
subsidize the cost of medications for many of their residents, including senior citizens, 
the disabled, and welfare recipients, so there is a strong motivation to genericize drugs 
once the drug’s patents have expired.50  In Canada, generic drug prices range from 56 
percent to 31 percent of the brand drug price.51  Generic companies have to wait for 
patents on innovative pharmaceuticals to expire, or they have to demonstrate that the 
existing patents on the innovative pharmaceuticals are invalid or irrelevant.   
 In 2013, there were $13.6 billion in sales of patented medicines, and $8.4 billion 
in sales of non-patented (mainly generic) medicines in Canada.  Since 2011, research and 
                                                          
49 Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, “Generic Prescription Drug Development” (July 2015) at 
p 10, online:    http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/resources/docs/DDBookletWebEng.pdf  
50 See, for example, the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary, which is a comprehensive list of drugs, or 
formulary, paid for by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care in the Province of Ontario.  The 
Ministry’s formulary can be found online on their website at 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/drugs/odbf_eformulary.aspx.  By searching “pantoprazole,” 
one can see the example of brand name Pantoloc 40mg.  The drug has a listed price of $2.0803 per tablet, 
but the Ministry only covers up to $0.3628 per tablet, which is the price of the generic “copies” listed on 
the site.  See “pms-pantoprazole 40mg ent tab” listed immediately above brand name Pantoloc 40mg.   
51 Patented Medicines Prices Review Board, Generic Drugs in Canada, 2013 www.pmrb-cepmb.gc.ca 
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development expenditures in Canada have dipped below $1 billion, and pharmaceutical 
research and development in Canada has fallen by 29 percent since 2001.52   
The Drug Approval Process in Canada  
  The drug approval process in Canada involves health law, patent law, and 
administrative law.  Health law regulates the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals 
through the Food and Drugs Act,53 which is administered through the Therapeutic 
Products Directorate of Health Canada.  Patent law, as discussed, deals with the 
monopolies granted for innovation within the industry through the Patent Act, which is 
administered by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office.  Administrative law plays an 
important role in linking patent law and health law through the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations to facilitate the approval of pharmaceuticals in 
Canada.  Administrative law also creates the framework for the judicial review of 
decisions related to approving generic medicines through the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulations, the Federal Court Act,54 and the Federal Court Rules.55   
 The Food and Drugs Act and The Food and Drug Regulations56  encompass the 
regulations for the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals required before approval to 
manufacture, market, and sell can be granted.  Sections 8 to 15 of the Food and Drugs 
Act outline the general prohibitions on the manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs in 
Canada, general requirements for sanitation and cleanliness, production facility 
                                                          
52 Taken from Industry Canada’s “Canadian Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (2014)” online: 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/lsg-pdsv.nsf/eng/h_hn01703.html.  Investment decreased by 29 percent over 
the period of 2001 to 2014.   
53 RSC 1985, c F-27.   
54 RSC, 1985, c F-7.   
55 SOR/98-106.   
56 CRC, c 870, 2016.    
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inspections, labelling requirements, and standardization requirements.57  Part C, Division 
8, of the Food and Drug Regulations58 provides specific guidelines for new drugs and 
generic drugs that are intended to be marketed and sold in Canada.  Division Eight 
regulations include clinical and safety study requirements, labelling requirements, and 
any other requirements for obtaining a Notice of Compliance, which is a notice that a 
drug product has successfully completed these requirements, and can therefore be 
manufactured and sold.  Division Eight also details the types of submissions allowed, and 
the specific requirements for each type.  The first type is the standard New Drug 
Submission, which applies to drugs that have never been marketed and sold before in 
Canada.  The second type is the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, which is for generic 
drugs, where a Notice of Compliance has already been granted to the innovator drug with 
the same active ingredient, in the same strength, and same dosage form.  The third type of 
submission is the Extraordinary Use New Drug Submission, which sets out the regulatory 
provisions for new drugs where it is not possible to conduct clinical trials on human 
                                                          
57 Data exclusivity is outlined in C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations.  This provision protects the 
safety and efficacy data of an innovative pharmaceutical for a minimum of eight years for a drug containing 
a new medicinal ingredient not previously approved by Health Canada from the date of filing for a Notice 
of Compliance.  In this provision, a generic manufacturer cannot file for a submission for a copy of the data 
for the first six years of the eight year period.  Subsection 5(5) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations clarifies the data exclusivity provisions under Canada’s Access to Medicines 
Regime, where the date for filing for the data is deemed to be six years after the issuance of a Notice of 
Compliance for the innovator pharmaceutical.  Data exclusivity is not an issue for investigation in this 
thesis but is an issue for future study, as data exclusivity provisions can affect market exclusivity.  An 
extension to the data exclusivity period was recently rejected by Canada during negotiations of the Canada-
European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement.  However, it is likely to be an issue in 
future international trade negotiations.   
58 Supra note 56, c.08 
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subjects.59  Health Canada publishes specific guidance documents for companies wishing 
to file a drug submission of any type.60   
 Original Research – The Process for Drug Approval 
  New drug research begins with scientists developing new chemical or biological 
substances.  New substances are isolated and purified, then administered to tissue 
cultures, called in vitro testing, and observed for physiological, biological, or behavioural 
changes.  Following promising in vitro results for a particular compound, in vivo testing 
(animal testing) for pharmacological efficacy, pharmacokinetics, and toxicity begins.  
Pharmacokinetic testing on animals tells researchers how that compound is distributed 
throughout the body, how it is metabolized and eliminated, and whether or not it could 
adversely affect human systems, like the reproductive system or the immune system.  
Pharmacokinetic testing enables researchers to determine safe dosage ranges for humans 
as well.  Researchers also conduct experiments with high dosages to try to induce the 
development of cancer cells in various tissues, providing information on the potential 
carcinogenicity of a given compound.  Through all of this experimentation and 
monitoring, researchers develop a profile of potential side effects from the compound as 
well.  This stage of research, encompassing in vitro and in vivo testing on animals, is 
known as pre-clinical testing.   
 If the initial tests indicate that the drug will be safe in humans, researchers file a 
Clinical Trial Application61 to Health Canada’s Health Products and Food Branch 
                                                          
59 For example, it is not possible to test an antidote on a human for a certain venomous snake bite, as it 
would be impossible to infect the human subjects with the poisonous venom and then test the antidote.   
60 Canada, Health Canada, Guidance Document: Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, 
File 15-101151-734, February 3, 2015.  This document clarifies provisions within the Regulations.   
61 Supra note 56, C.05.005.   
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Inspectorate for authorization to conduct clinical trials in humans, for establishing the 
effectiveness of a compound for specific indications.  If granted, researchers conduct 
Phase I Clinical Trials, where the drug is given to small groups of people, often between 
twenty and eighty.  The researchers gather preliminary data on the effectiveness of a drug 
for a specified disease or condition.  They try to attain clinical results in the test subjects 
while maintaining a tolerable level of side effects.  They also perform more safety 
evaluation by determining safe dose ranges and the toxicity of the drug, and evaluate it 
for potential interactions with other pharmaceuticals.   
 Following successful Phase I Clinical Trials, researchers file another Clinical 
Trial Application62 and begin Phase II Clinical Trials, where the compound is given to 
larger groups of people, typically of one hundred to three hundred, who have the 
condition for which the drug is intended to treat.  The larger studies are undertaken to 
confirm the compound’s effectiveness, monitor its side effects, compare it to other 
treatments for the same condition, and establish safety guidelines for safe use by the 
public.   
 After successful Phase Two Clinical Trials, the researcher files another Clinical 
Trial Application for Phase III Clinical Trials, with the primary objective of establishing 
the efficacy of the new drug at differing dosages.  Phase III Clinical Trials involve one 
thousand to three thousand subjects with the targeted medical condition, often in multiple 
study locations.  Because of the large number of test subjects, there is a higher likelihood 
that adverse reactions will be observed amongst the subjects, which are documented.   
                                                          
62 Supra note 58.  An application process is required for each type of clinical trial.   
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 If the results at the end of Phase III still look promising, a “New Drug 
Submission” can be filed with the Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, which 
includes the data contained in the clinical and preclinical studies.  The data is submitted 
in conjunction with information on how and where the drug will be produced.  The 
submission is reviewed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug.  If the Health 
Products and Food Branch Inspectorate determine that the benefits of the drug outweigh 
its potential risks, the drug is issued a Notice of Compliance and a Drug Identification 
Number, which authorizes the manufacturer to produce and sell the drug in Canada.63  
Post marketing surveillance of the new drug by the manufacturer is also required to 
ensure the safety and effectiveness of the drug, even after it has been made available to 
the public.   
 Following the issuance of a Notice of Compliance and a Drug Identification 
Number, the drug company makes a decision as to whether it will market the drug 
product.  If it decides to move forward, the company submits its product summary 
information to the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board,64 which reviews the 
information and sets a price that is intended to reflect a balance among several factors, 
including the cost of developing the product, the size of the market for the drug, and the 
affordability of the drug to the consumer.   
 Following the establishment of a price, the drug company begins consultation 
with federal and provincial drug plans to establish coverage for the product.  Following 
                                                          
63 The review period for a New Drug Application is typically two months to seven years, with an average of 
two years.  Supra note 47 at 418.   
64 The Patented Medicines Prices Review Board was established in s 91 of the Patent Act through 
amendment in 1987.  The mandate, composition, and rules of the Board are set out from s 79(1) to s 103 of 
the Patent Act.   
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discussions about the efficacy of the product and a comparison to existing treatments, 
listing and reimbursement decisions are made.   
 Following the discussion with drug plans, the company launches the product, 
making it accessible to the public.  Upon the launch, the company provides extensive 
communications with physicians in accordance with the Notice of Compliance.  
Specifically, the information must stipulate: the patient population for whom the drug can 
be prescribed, the indications that the drug can treat, and the dosages that can be 
administered.  After the launch, additional therapeutic monitoring and cost-effectiveness 
studies are performed, as well as adverse drug reaction monitoring, all of which 
contribute to future decisions by both government and company officials about the 
continued availability of the product.     
 Generic Drug Development 
 It is the Abbreviated New Drug Submission that is of primary concern in this 
thesis, as this is the process for getting approval to manufacture and sell generic 
medicines in Canada.  This abbreviated submission process allows generic manufacturers 
to sidestep the safety and efficacy requirements involved in the New Drug Submission, 
only being required to demonstrate bioequivalence with the original product – it must be 
the same product, and it must provide the same level of drug in the bloodstream, within 
very narrow limits.  It is the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations 
which come into effect after the generic manufacturer has established bioequivalence and 
wishes to have the product approved for marketing.  If patents remain on the innovative 
product, but the generic manufacturer feels that those patents are invalid or will not be 
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infringed upon, it can allege these claims against the innovator, and invoke the 
Regulations, which will be discussed after an introduction to patents.   
 Patenting and Innovation65 
  For any invention that meets the requirements outlined in the Patent Act,66 a 
patent is granted to the inventor by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office.  The patent 
allows the inventor, or the owner of the patent, an exclusive time period to manufacture, 
distribute, and sell the invention. In Canada, this exclusive period is twenty years from 
the date of filing an application to patent the invention.67  In exchange for the monopoly, 
the inventor must disclose a full description of the patent so that the information is 
available for others to use as a stepping stone to further innovation.68  With respect to 
medicines, the patent is granted for the advancement to medicine and health, in exchange 
for disclosure of the patent, so that others may take that advancement and improve upon 
it.   
 Section 2 of the Patent Act defines an invention as any “new and useful art, 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”69  
From this definition, four key requirements can be set forth for all patents: novelty, 
utility, non-obviousness, and patentable subject-matter.   
                                                          
65 For an introduction to patent theory and practice, consult David Vaver’s Intellectual Property Law: 
Copyright, Patents, Trademarks, (2011), Toronto: Irwin Law.  David Vaver is a professor of law, 
specializing in the field of intellectual property at Osgoode Law School of York University.   
66 Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4.   
67 Ibid at s 42, 44. 
68 This is known as the traditional patent bargain, which was first legislated in the Statute of Monopolies, 
1623, 21 Jac 1, c 23 (Eng).  Although the idea of bargaining a monopoly for disclosure of the invention has 
been around for centuries, it is extremely important in the modern economy, where many developed nations 
have transitioned from an industrial economic base to a knowledge-intensive economic base.   
69 Supra note 66, s 2. 
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 Novelty 
 The first requirement, that the subject matter is new,70 is met if the invention has 
not yet been disclosed to the public.71  This requirement, known as novelty, means that 
the patent cannot have been previously disclosed in Canada or elsewhere.   An invention 
that has been deemed to have been part of the prior art of a particular industry is not 
novel.  Paragraph 28.2(1) states that 
 The subject-matter, defined by a claim in an application for patent in Canada (the 
 “pending application”) must not have been disclosed 
(a) more than one year before the filing date by the applicant, or by a person who 
obtained knowledge, directly or indirectly, from the applicant, in such a 
manner that the subject-matter became available to the public in Canada or 
elsewhere; 
(b) before the claim date by a person not mentioned in paragraph (a) in such a 
manner that the subject-matter became available to the public in Canada or 
elsewhere;  
(c) in an application for a patent that is filed in Canada by a person other than the 
applicant, and has a filing date that is before the claim date;…72  
 
This provision also provides a grace period of one year for manufacturers who disclose 
their invention to the public but have not yet filed the patent application.   
 With respect to pharmaceuticals, the patents in question are molecules that 
represent new compositions of matter.  These molecules may represent an “active 
ingredient” that has an effect on the body, or they can represent new molecules that are 
important aids in making sure that the active ingredient works, or is delivered to its 
intended tissue in the body.   
                                                          
70 The Patent Act, s 27(4) states that the subject matter of the patent must be defined explicitly in the claims 
section of the patent.  It is the written claims that make up the patent, not the visual descriptions.   
71 Supra note 66, s 28.2(1).  The subject matter defined in the claims must not have been disclosed more 
than one year before the filing date.   
72 Supra note 66, s 28.2(1)(a)(b)(c).  
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 Utility 
 The second requirement, that the invention be useful, means that the subject 
matter of the patent must have some utility or benefit to the public, and therefore achieves 
a purpose related to why it was invented.  The patent must do what it promises, and 
following the claims outlined in the patent should set out the method for making the 
invention.  Utility must be proven at the time of the application, or demonstrated by the 
doctrine of sound prediction.  This is particularly relevant for pharmaceuticals, since 
demonstrating the utility of a new molecule for health purposes is difficult to do before 
significant safety and efficacy testing can take place.  This testing can take years; without 
the doctrine of sound prediction, there would be no way to establish patent protection for 
the new molecule.  The doctrine of sound prediction is not set out within the Patent Act, 
rather, it has developed through jurisprudence with three elements:  
1) There must be a factual basis for the prediction;… 
2) the inventor must have at the date of the patent application an articulable and 
“sound” line of reasoning from which the desired result can be inferred from 
the factual basis;…. 
3) There must be proper disclosure…of why the invention works.73 
 
The opportunity to supply a theory as to why the invention works is contentious, as it is 
difficult to assess the merits of the theory ahead of the data and testing required, making 
it fairly easy to satisfy the element of utility.  But the utility satisfied for the grant of a 
patent has no bearing on subsequent challenges to that utility, as proceedings for 
impeaching patents that do not meet the patent criteria after more data is made available, 
                                                          
73 Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, [2002] 4 SCR 153 at para 70.  In this case, 
Justice Binnie states that it is “generally not necessary for an inventor to provide a theory of why the 
invention works….In this sort of case, however, the sound prediction is to some extent the quid pro quo the 
applicant offers in exchange for the patent monopoly.”   
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are set out in Section 60 of the Patent Act, and can be instituted at any time.74  This is 
particularly relevant to pharmaceutical patents, where data about the efficacy of a 
particular drug can only be determined after several years of testing on humans.75 
 Non-Obviousness 
 The third requirement is that the invention has a non-obvious step, as outlined in 
s. 28.3 of the Patent Act, which states that “[t]he subject-matter must not have been 
obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it 
pertains,…”76  This means that some ingenuity was not part of the prior art of the 
particular industrial discipline of the invention.  An invention can only be deemed to have 
an inventive step (or be considered non-obvious) if a person skilled in the art related to 
the industry of the invention would not have predicted the solution or mechanism 
contained within that invention.77  If “any fool could have done that,”78 as asserted by 
Justice Jugessen in Beloit Canada, there is no inventive step involved in the invention.   
 Obviousness can be a difficult concept.  It may be obvious, for example, that two 
plus two is four, but it is less obvious that changing one subgroup on a complicated 
molecule that has been granted a patent could lead to a new patent for the new molecule.  
There may have been some inventiveness in the chemical process for getting that new 
                                                          
74 Supra note 66, s 60(1).   
75 This happens in phase two and phase three clinical trials.  In Phase two clinical trials, a new drug is given 
to a group of one hundred or more people to obtain some initial data on the effectiveness of the drug for a 
specified disease or condition.  In phase three, the drug is given to larger groups of people, typically one 
thousand or more, to confirm its effectiveness and compare it to common treatments for that same 
indication.   
76 Supra note 66, s 28.3.  “The subject-matter must not “have been obvious on the claim date to a person 
skilled in the art or science to which it pertains.”  This is also known as the inventive step requirement, and 
its interpretation has been confirmed by Canadian jurisprudence, including Burton Parsons v Hewlett 
Packard (Canada) Ltd., [1976] 1 SCR 555.    
77 Beecham Canada Ltd. v Proctor & Gamble Co., [1982] 61 CPR (2d) 7 (Can). 
78 Beloit Canada Ltd. v Valmet Oy (1986), 8 CPR (3d) 289 at 293 (FCA), [Beloit Canada].   
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subgroup on the molecule, but that chemical process may be well-known to other 
chemists who have applied it to other molecules.  However, application of that chemical 
step in this particular case, may lead to a compound with a new use, which should be 
sufficient to meet the requirement of obviousness.   
 In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc.,79 Justice Rothstein summarized a 
four-step approach to determine obviousness: 
 (1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”; 
       (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person; 
 (2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or, if that cannot readily 
 be done, construe it; 
 (3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming 
 part of the “state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as 
 construed; 
 (4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those  
 differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled 
 in the art or do they require any degree of invention?80 
 
However, Justice Rothstein warned against using the four-step approach as a rigid test of 
obviousness, explaining that “in most matters in which a judge or a jury is called upon to 
make a factual determination, rigid rules are inappropriate unless mandated by statute.”81 
 The test does squarely situate a medicinal chemist, organic chemist, or 
pharmaceutical chemist as a notional person skilled in the art of making novel molecular 
compounds as the person to which the test of obviousness must be applied, and it 
identifies a body of knowledge held by these specialists.  The test also states that the 
inventive concept must be identified (if possible) and compared to the art that already 
exists within the knowledge of that group of specialists.  At this point, any differences 
                                                          
79 Supra note 39, [Sanofi-Synthelabo].   
80 Ibid at para 67.   
81 Ibid at para 63, quoted in Corlac Inc. et al v Weatherford Canada Ltd., 2011 FCA 228 (FCA per Layden-
Stevenson JA, Nadon and Evans JJA concurring) at para 67.   
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with the inventive step to the existing art are evaluated to determine if they are significant 
enough to constitute an invention. 
 The fourth part of the test in Sanofi-Synthelabo, known as the obvious-to-try test, 
has been applied in subsequent pharmaceutical cases, notably Eli Lilly Canada Inc. et al v 
Novopharm Limited,82 where Justice Layden-Stevenson, for the majority, states that “the 
‘obvious to try’ inquiry will be appropriate in areas of endeavour where advances are 
often won by experimentation, such as in the pharmaceutical industry.”83  Justice Layden-
Stevenson then references Sanofi-Synthelabo to identify factors to be taken into account 
when assessing whether or not something was worth a try: 
1. Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work?  Are 
there a finite number of identified predictable solutions known to persons 
skilled in the art? 
2. What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the 
invention?  Are routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged 
and arduous, such that trials would not be considered routine?   
3. Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent 
addresses?84 
 
 The obvious-to-try doctrine reigns-in pharmaceutical companies from creating a 
blanket of patents across a range of related synthesized molecules.  Companies could 
apply a battery of processes to one molecule and patent thousands of molecules, based on 
the ordinary application of chemistry across the entire range, with the hopes that one or 
more molecule in the entire range holds promise.  Obviousness, and the obvious-to-try 
doctrine puts limits on this.   
                                                          
82 2010 FCA 197 at paras 54-64. 
83 Ibid at para 55.   
84 Ibid.   
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 Patentable Subject Matter 
 The fourth requirement is that the invention be patentable subject matter.  Section 
27(8) of the Patent Act provides that “No patent shall be granted for any mere scientific 
principle or abstract theorem.”  In general, what constitutes patentable subject matter is 
defined by the five categories in the Patent Act definition in Section 2: “art, process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”85  “Art” has been defined as “the 
application of knowledge to effect a desired result.”86  A process is “the application of a 
method to a material or materials.”87  A process may be patentable even though the 
process does not produce a product that is patentable.88  A machine is defined as “the 
mechanical embodiment of any function or mode of operation designed to accomplish a 
particular effect.”89  Manufacture “implies a product made by hand, by machine, 
industrially, by mass production and so forth, by changing the character or condition of 
material objects.”90  A composition of matter has been defined “as a combination of 
ingredients – a solid, a gas, or fluid – as a chemical union or a physical mixture.”91  This 
definition has come to include lower life forms, such as cells, enzymes, and genes, but 
excludes multicellular organisms and higher life forms.92 
                                                          
85 Supra note 66, s 2.   
86 Shell Oil Co v Commissioner of Patents, [1962] 2 SCR 536.   
87 Commissioner of Patents v Ciba Ltd., [1959] SCR 278 at 383.   
88 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice (1998 ed., updated to December 
2010), c. 12.02.02.   
89 Ibid at c. 12.02.03.   
90 Ibid at c. 12.02.04.  In Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 SCR 45 at para 
155, “manufacture” and “composition of matter” were not considered to encompass higher life forms.  This 
was won by a narrow five to four majority.   
91 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-Marks, 2nd ed (Toronto: Iriwn Law, 
2011) at 294.   
92 Patenting, and the distinction between higher life forms and simple life forms has been adjudicated 
through Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 SCR 45 and Monsanto Canada 
Inc. v Schmeiser [2004] 1 SCR 902, 2004 SCC 34.   
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 Infringement versus Impeachment 
 Patent infringement is the act of using the patent of another person or organization 
without authorization - valid patents are given protection from this under the Patent Act.93  
Impeachment refers to the process of challenging an existing patent in Federal Court to 
have it declared void.94  With parties involved in patent litigation, impeachment is often a 
counterclaim to an infringement claim, and vice versa.   
 Patent Litigation 
 Regardless of the underlying type of patent, a full dispute resolution mechanism is 
available for litigating the validity of a patent.95  The majority of patent disputes at the 
Supreme Court arise through the Federal Court of Canada, with leave to appeal to the 
Federal Court of Appeal, followed by leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.96  
There is, however, no law forbidding a patent infringement or invalidity case from being 
initiated in any provincial jurisdiction.  For example, in Beauchesne v Roy,97 Mr. 
Beauchesne had a patent on a drill, but Mr. Marcotte was issued a patent for an 
improvement upon Mr. Beauchesne’s patent.  Mr. Marcotte started producing his drill, 
and Mr. Beauchesne sought an injunction to stop the production, since the drill infringed 
his patent.  The Quebec Superior Court of Appeal held that the drill produced by Mr. 
Marcotte did infringe on Mr. Beauchesne’s drill, since the Mr. Marcotte’s patented 
                                                          
93 Supra note 66, s 42 to s 46 covers the rights granted to a patent holder.  Manufacturing, using, and selling 
a patented invention by someone other than the patent holder constitutes infringement.   
94 Supra note 66, s 60.   
95 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, an alternate dispute mechanism for assessing patent invalidity 
applies during the Abbreviated New Drug Submission process for generic pharmaceuticals under the 
Patented Medicines Notice of Compliance program.  Judicial review abbreviates some of the elements of a 
full trial, and only assesses whether Health Canada acted reasonably when adding patents to the Patent 
Register.   
96 Patent disputes can originate in any provincial trial court but most often arise in the Federal Court of 
Canada.   
97 JQ 11598, [2007] QCCS 4601.   
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improvement did not allow him to infringe Mr. Beauchesne’s patent, which was still in 
force.  This case demonstrates that patent infringement suits can originate in provincial 
court.   
 Regardless of the court, the dispute is brought as a patent infringement action 
under Section 42 of the Patent Act, which establishes the rights of the patent holder: 
Every patent granted under this Act shall contain the title or name of the 
invention, with a reference to the specification, and shall, subject to this Act, grant 
to the patentee and the patentee’s legal representatives for the term of the patent, 
from the granting of the patent, the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of 
making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used, 
subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of competent 
jurisdiction.98 
 
After a decision at trial court is rendered, Section 63 of The Patent Act facilitates appeal 
at any provincial appellate court or at the Federal Court of Appeal: 
Every judgment voiding in whole or in part or refusing to void in whole or in part 
any patent is subject to appeal to any court having appellate jurisdiction in other 
cases decided by the court by which the judgment was rendered.99 
 
Similarly, the Federal Courts Act, Section 27(1), indicates that there is wide scope for 
appealing a decision at the Federal Court: 
An appeal lies to the Federal Court of Appeal from any of the following decisions of 
the Federal Court: 
(a) a final judgment;  
(b) a judgment on a question of law determined before trial;  
(c) an interlocutory judgment; or  
(d) a determination on a reference made by a federal board, commission or other           
tribunal or the Attorney General of Canada. 100  
 
As opposed to patent infringement, a dispute may also arise over the granting of a patent 
by the Commissioner of Patents at the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Division of 
                                                          
98 Supra note 66, s 42. 
99 Supra note 66, s 65. 
100 Supra note 54 at s 27(1).   
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Patents.  If a dispute arises as a result of an applicant who is denied a patent claim by the 
Commissioner of Patents, the applicant files for action against the Commissioner in 
Federal Court, as outlined in the Patent Act, Section 17: 
In all cases where an appeal is provided from the decision of the Commissioner to 
the Federal Court under this Act, the appeal shall be had and taken pursuant to the 
Federal Courts Act and the rules and practice of that Court.101 
 
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is confirmed in Section 41:  
Every person who has failed to obtain a patent by reason of a refusal of the 
Commissioner to grant it may, at any time within six months after notice as 
provided for in section 40 has been mailed, appeal from the decision of the 
Commissioner to the Federal Court and that Court has exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the appeal.102 
 
A patent decision by a provincial court of final instance or by the Federal Court of 
Appeal can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada under Section 40 (1) of the 
Supreme Court Act: 
…an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final or other judgment of the 
Federal Court of Appeal or of the highest court of final resort in a province, or a 
judge thereof, in which judgment can be had in the particular case sought to be 
appealed to the Supreme Court, whether or not leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court has been refused by any other court, where, with respect to the particular 
case sought to be appealed, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that any question 
involved therein is, by reason of its public importance or the importance of any 
issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in that question, one that 
ought to be decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a 
nature or significance as to warrant decision by it, and leave to appeal from that 
judgment is accordingly granted by the Supreme Court.103 
 
                                                          
101 Supra note 66 at s 17. 
102 Supra note 66 at s 41. 
103 Supreme Court Act, R.S., 1985, c. S-26, s 40. 
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 Pharmaceutical Companies and Patent Litigation 
 When an innovative pharmaceutical company has an opportunity to oppose a 
decision about generic approval, it is understandable that it would choose to do so, 
resulting in a delay that extends the market life and profits of its branded 
product,104whether it be through its rights under the Patent Act or through the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  To understand the enormity of the 
litigation problem for generics under the current Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations,  
Apotex recently claimed that in the last 10 years, it has spent $800 million on 
litigation.  Extrapolating from this to the other generic and brand firms, it appears 
that annual litigation costs relating to pharmaceuticals in Canada are in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, chiefly for litigation between generic and brand 
name firms.  Indeed, there are in order of 100 Federal Court cases each year 
involving pharmaceutical patents.105 
 
According to Grootendorst and Hollis, “Apotex alone has been a party in 432 different 
cases considered by the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal since 1997.”106    
 Innovative pharmaceutical companies are so opposed to generic competition that 
they oppose subsequent challenges by follow-on generic companies even after losing the 
initial challenge from the first generic company.  Such was the case with Sanofi-Aventis’ 
blockbuster hypertension drug Altace (with the generic name of ramipril), with its novel 
                                                          
104 Research on the motives behind innovator drug companies’ patenting strategies has been undertaken by 
Ron Bouchard, an associate professor of Law, Medicine, and Dentistry at the University of Alberta.  He has 
written over twenty publications in the area of intellectual property, many of which specifically deal with 
pharmaceuticals, and the issues surrounding patent invalidity, expiry, and genericization.  See, for example, 
Ron Bouchard et al, “Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value 
Pharmaceuticals” (2010) 8(2) Nw J Tech & IP 174.  In this essay, he concluded that extensive patenting 
combined with linkage regulations allow innovator companies to block the generic entry of 
pharmaceuticals in a timely manner.   
105 Paul Grootendorst & Aidan Hollis,  “Managing Pharmaceutical Expenditure” (2011) Cdn Hlth Srv Rsch 
Fdn at note 5, p 12, online:  
http://www.cfhi-fcass.ca/SearchResultsNews/11-02-18/85553e6f-379f-47d7-8817-4056e69360b7.aspx 
106 Ibid.    
41 
 
 
angiotensin converting enzyme mechanism.107  Sanofi lost its first challenge from generic 
manufacturer Apotex,108 which filed Notices of Allegations against several of Sanofi’s 
patents.  Apotex was subsequently issued a Notice of Compliance to produce the drug.  
When three generic manufacturers followed suit and issued Notices of Allegation over 
Sanofi’s same patents, Sanofi still defended its patents, even though they had been found 
to be invalid.109 
 The best evidence of the aggressive posture of innovative pharmaceutical 
companies toward the generic manufactures is that approximately one-half to two-thirds 
of the litigated pharmaceutical patents through the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations are found to be invalid or not infringed.110  By challenging 
these patents, generic manufacturers allow entry of a generic earlier than would otherwise 
occur.  Lipitor (atorvastatin), a popular cholesterol-lowering drug, has patent expiry dates 
as late as 2022, but generic challenges to these patents resulted in generic alternatives 
twelve years before the expiry of the last patent.111   
                                                          
107 For a basic understanding of pharmacology, see Stan Bardal, Applied Phramacology, 2nd ed, 2011 
(Toronto: Elsevier). 
108 Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v The Minister of Health, the Attorney General of Canada, and Apotex Inc., 
2006 FC 1559. 
109 Sanofi-Aventis defended the allegations under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations against Laboratoire Riva, Pharmascience, and Novopharm (now known as Teva).  The relevant 
cases are: Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v Novopharm Limited 2006 FC 1135, Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v 
Laboratoire Riva Inc. 2007 FC 532, Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v Pharmascience Inc. 2008 FC 782.  
110 Paul Grootendorst and Aidan Hollis, “Drug Market Exclusivity in the EU and Canada: Problems with 
Norton Rose’s Comparative Analysis,” Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association: 2012 at 6.  The data 
was extracted from: Health Canada Notice, “Release of the Therapeutic Products Directorate Statistical 
Report 2010 for the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and Data Protection,” July 28, 
2011.  The figure of two-thirds is computed by dividing the number of dismissed PM(NOC) S.6 Prohibition 
Applications over the total number of S.6 Prohibition Applications.  For the period of 2005 to 2010, 40 out 
of 61 applications were dismissed.  An updated figure is available from Health Canada Notice, 
“Therapeutic Products Directorate Statistical Report 2014/2015,” July 2015.  Over the period of 2010 to 
July, 2015, 33 S.6 Prohibition Applications were granted while 27 were dismissed.  This reduces the two 
thirds rejection rate to 45 percent.   
111 Ibid.   
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A History of Compulsory Licencing and the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations 
 Regulatory approval and patent protection of pharmaceuticals remained distinct 
until 1993, governed independently by the Food and Drugs Act and the Patent Act.  In 
1993, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations linked the two regimes 
in order to expedite the approval process of generic pharmaceuticals.  Prior to 1993, 
Canada had a compulsory licencing system through the Patent Act, where a generic 
manufacturer could apply for a licence to manufacture and sell a patented pharmaceutical 
product without the consent of the holder of the patent: 
(a) Where the invention is a process, to use the invention for the preparation or 
production of medicine, import any medicine in the preparation or production 
of which the invention has been used or sell any medicine in the preparation 
or production of which the invention has been used, or (b) where the invention 
is other than a process, to import, make, use or sell the invention for medicine 
or for the preparation or production of medicine….112 
 
 In exchange for a compulsory licence, the generic manufacture was required to 
pay a four percent royalty to the brand manufacturer for the duration of any patents 
covering the drug.113  Criteria for issuing a compulsory licence were never specified, and 
the issuance of licences to generic manufacturers was routine.  In 1984, the Government 
of Canada established the Eastman Commission,114 which determined that almost 80 
percent of applications for compulsory licences in Canada were granted between 1969 
and 1983,115 which meant that there was really very little patent protection available for 
                                                          
112 Supra note 66, s 39(4) [removed].   
113 Canada, Library of Parliament, Law and Government Division.  Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
Products in Canada – Chronology of Significant Events by Margaret Smith.  Ottawa: 2000 (Cat No PRB 
99-64B), online: http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb9946-e.htm  
114 Canada, Commission of Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Industry (“Eastman Commission”), Minister of Supply and Services, 
Ottawa, 1985.   
115 Colleen Chien, “Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?” (2003) 18 Berkeley Tech LJ 853 at 875.  The Eastman Commission 
43 
 
 
innovative pharmaceuticals.  It did, however, indicate that compulsory licencing 
contributed to the growth of the generic pharmaceutical industry in Canada, which saved 
consumers $211 million in 1983 on medicine sales totalling $1.6 billion.116  In 1987, the 
government passed Bill C-22, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain 
Matters in Relation Thereto117 in order to address the recommendations of the Eastman 
Commission.  Bill C-22 amended the Patent Act to guarantee new drugs given a Notice 
of Compliance a minimum of ten years of exclusivity before compulsory licences could 
be issued to imported copies of the drug, and seven years of exclusivity after the issuance 
of a Notice of Compliance before compulsory licences could be issued to companies 
manufacturing that drug in Canada.118  For drugs invented and manufactured in Canada, 
additional protection was granted, in that a compulsory licence could not be granted to an 
imported copy of that drug at all.119  Under these circumstances, a compulsory licence 
could only be granted for seven years after the issuance of the Notice of Compliance if 
the inventor did not manufacture the drug in Canada for the purpose of supplying the 
Canadian market.120   
 Bill C-22 also balanced the increased level of patent protection afforded to 
patented medicines producers by introducing price controls through the creation of the 
Patented Medicines Prices Review Board (PMPRB).  The board’s mandate was to ensure 
that the prices of patented medicines do not become excessive by setting the maximum 
                                                          
was established by the federal government in 1984 to make recommendations about the patenting of 
pharmaceuticals in Canada.   
116 Supra note 114, at xviii and 317.   
117 SC 1987, c41, [Bill C-22].     
118 Ibid at ss 39.11 and 39.14.   
119 Ibid at ss 39.16.   
120 Ibid.   
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price at which the patentee can sell the medicine, thereby balancing the additional patent 
protection afforded under the bill.   
 Compulsory Licencing and International Trade Agreements 
 Two major developments in international trade led to the eventual removal of 
compulsory licences from the Patent Act: the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.121  Through 
NAFTA, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed to “foster 
creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are the subject of 
intellectual property rights.”122  In addition, one of the objectives of NAFTA was to 
“provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
in each Party’s territory.”123  Article 1704 permits each country to specify in its domestic 
laws licencing measures to prevent or control “abuse of intellectual property rights 
having an adverse effect on competition.”124  The specifics of compulsory licencing are 
established in paragraph ten, Article 1709,125 which set out the duration, scope, 
remuneration, and that the purpose for compulsory licencing must be only to supply the 
domestic market of the country in question.126   
 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral trade 
agreement established in 1947 to reduce international trade barriers among United 
Nations member states.127  The Marrakesh Agreement was the final round of negotiations 
                                                          
121 Article 27.1 of TRIPS reads “in part…patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to…whether products are imported or locally produced.”   
122 Supra note 3 in preamble.    
123 Supra note 3, Ch 1, Art 102(d).   
124 Supra note 3, Ch 17, Art 1704.   
125 Supra note 3, Ch 17, Art 1709.10.   
126 Supra note 3, Ch 17, Art 1709.10(c), 1709.10(f), 1709.109(h).  See Appendix One for the entirety of 
Article 1709.   
127 Oct 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 194; 61 Stat pt 5; TIAS No 1700.   
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of GATT, which established the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the forum for 
negotiating agreements, reducing trade obstacles, and settling trade disputes:128 
 The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of  
 trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and 
 associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.129 
 
TRIPS, a comprehensive multilateral intellectual property agreement annexed to the 
Marrakesh agreement, requires that domestic laws of signatory countries meet minimum 
standards related to all aspects of intellectual property, including patents, trademarks, 
copyright, industrial design, geographical indicators, plant variety protection, integrated 
circuit protection, trade secrets, and test data.130  Ratification of TRIPS is a prerequisite to 
WTO membership,131 and all 153 member states have ratified the agreement, including 
Canada.  In 1991, the then Director-General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, compiled the 
Draft Final Act for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which also 
contained the draft agreement on TRIPS.  The text created by Dunkel was endorsed by 
the federal government in 1992 when it signed TRIPS.  The text of NAFTA was also 
finalized in Chapter 17, which was largely based on the text of the TRIPS Agreement.  
TRIPS Article 31, “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” 132 addresses 
compulsory licencing, and is almost identical to Article 1709.10 of NAFTA.   
 The text of Article 31 of TRIPS became available to the governments of the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico while negotiating NAFTA in 1991, which explains 
                                                          
128 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr 15, `994, 1867 UNTS 154; 33 
ILM 1144 (1994), Annex J, Art 2.   
129 Ibid, Art II, para 1.   
130 Supra note 4, Part I and II.   
131 Supra note 128 at Art XXXIV.  This article states that the annexes to GATT are an integral part of the 
agreement.  TRIPs is contained in Annex 1C of GATT.   
132 Supra note 4, Art 31.  
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the similarity in the provisions in Chapter 17 of NAFTA, covering copyright, sound 
recordings, trademarks, and patents.  As indicated by a member of the Canadian TRIPS 
and NAFTA negotiating teams, “NAFTA closely tracks the language of the 1991 Dunkel 
draft of the TRIPS negotiating text.  Therefore, NAFTA’s Chapter 17 and TRIPS 
generally are textually close enough to ensure that interpretations of the meaning of one 
would be directly relevant to the interpretation of the other.  Findings of NAFTA panels 
regarding intellectual property issues may therefore powerfully influence TRIPS 
interpretation and vice versa.”133 
 On January 1, 1994, legislation implementing NAFTA came into force in 
Canada.134  On January 1, 1995, Canada became a member of TRIPS.135  Because of the 
obligations in Chapter 17 of NAFTA and Article 31 in TRIPS, Canada removed almost 
all of its compulsory licencing provisions from Section 39 of the Patent Act through Bill 
C-91, the Patent Act Amendment Act.136  Since both agreements prohibited the 
discrimination by field of technology, Bill C-91 removed all provisions related 
specifically to food and medicine,137 and provisions related to discrimination based on 
imported or domestically manufactured goods were also removed in the NAFTA 
Implementation Act.138  This eliminated the provisions related to compulsory licences in 
Bill C-22.   
                                                          
133 Supra note 5.  Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products – Complaint by the European 
Communities and their Member States – Report of the Panel, March 17, 2000, WT/DS114/R footnote 29, 
citing Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol 23 (1997).    
134 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, SC 1993, c 44.   
135 World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, 1994, c 47.   
136 S 39 was repealed in 1993.  
137 Patent Act Amendment Act, SC 1993, c 2, s 3.    
138 Supra note 134.   
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 Without compulsory licencing, there was no legal mechanism for challenging the 
validity of patents on innovative pharmaceuticals before expiry, short of initiating patent 
impeachment actions, which would have raised the cost and extended the time for 
developing generics.  By implementing the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations in 1993, the premature marketing and sale of generics was blocked, but 
generic manufacturers were given an opportunity to challenge patent status on innovative 
pharmaceuticals in advance of the expiration of their patents.  This is articulated through 
Health Canada’s stated pharmaceutical patent policy objective, which is to “balance the 
effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely entry of their 
lower priced generic competitors.”139  This aim of balancing motivations was recognized 
by the judiciary in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), where Justice 
Binnie stated that “it seems clear that the NOC regulations were introduced to help 
generic drug companies and at the same time to curb potential patent abuse by them.”140   
 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations are consistent with 
the protection of patents in the Patent Act, as explained by Section 55.2(4) of the Patent 
Act: 
The Governor in Council may make such regulations as the Governor in Council 
considers necessary for preventing the infringement of a patent by any person 
who makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with 
subsection (1), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing 
regulations: (a) respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled before a notice, 
certificate, permit or other document concerning any product to which a patent 
may relate may be issued to a patentee or other person under any Act of 
                                                          
139 Canada, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Canada Gazette, Part II, October 18, 2006.   
140 [2005] 1 SCR 533 at para 47.  In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada, the court also stated that the 
compulsory licencing regime was abolished in favor of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations “in order to protect the right of patentees by preventing generic manufacturers from marketing 
their products until the expiry of all relevant patents.” (para 46).   
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Parliament that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of that product 
in addition to any conditions provided for by or under that Act.141 
 
This section indicates that the government can make additional regulations for preventing 
infringement, and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations were 
borne out of this possibility.  The Regulations define the conditions under which an 
application for a generic drug will be approved for manufacture, sale, and distribution in 
Canada.  Besides outlining the terms for approval when the patents on an innovative drug 
expires, it outlines the conditions for challenging existing patents on medicines that may 
not be valid or relevant to the drug that the generic manufacturer wishes to copy.  The 
provisions of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations will be 
explained in Chapter Four.   
  
                                                          
141 Supra note 66 at s 55.2(4).   
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Chapter Four: The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations - Elements 
and Issues involving Health Law, Patent Law, and Judicial Review142 
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations are the roadmap for 
the approval of generic pharmaceuticals in Canada.  The Regulations provide for a Patent 
Register where all patents on approved medicines in Canada must be registered, and also 
provide the framework for generic manufacturers to challenge the validity or applicability 
of those patents, which may be unnecessarily holding up the genericization of a particular 
medicine.  A discussion of judicial review, and how a challenge through the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations operates within the framework of judicial 
review is essential to the analysis in Chapter Six, since the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases will be compared directly to the copyright cases, which also arrived at 
the Supreme Court after judicial review.  Finding a similar pattern of decision making 
could suggest that it is the judicial review process that is problematic, providing a cue for 
further investigation into its elements.  A discussion of the potential shortcomings of 
judicial review within the context of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations will also ensue.   
 Section Four – Health Canada’s Patent Register 
 Through Section 4(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations, the Minister of Health has a duty to maintain a Patent Register, which lists 
all of the patents that have been deemed to be relevant to a particular innovative 
pharmaceutical approved for sale in Canada.  Any new drug product going through the 
                                                          
142 This walk-through as to how the provisions of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations operate specifically guides the reader through the process that would apply to a generic 
manufacturer who is submitting a new generic pharmaceutical, based on an existing innovative 
pharmaceutical in Canada.   
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approval process must submit its associated patents to the Minister of Health,143 who 
decides which patents for a given pharmaceutical qualify and can therefore be listed on 
the Patent Register.  The Minister has a duty to determine which patents should or should 
not get listed, as well as which should be removed, should a patent expire or be declared 
invalid by the court for a particular pharmaceutical.  The patents listed on the Register are 
given protection under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations so 
that generic companies cannot legally use them before expiry or a successful challenge to 
their inclusion on the Register.  To be included on the Register, the patents must be filed 
at the same time as the overall submission and be of appropriate subject matter. 144  The 
patentable subject matter can include claims for the medicine itself (which would the 
actual molecule, known as the active ingredient), structural variants of the molecule that 
arise during its synthesis,145 novel dosage forms for carrying the medicine,146 and the 
medical uses of the medicine.147  All of these claims must be relevant to the drug product 
undergoing approval. 148   
                                                          
143 The Office of Patented Medicines Liaison, a branch of the Therapeutics Products Directorate at Health 
Canada, is the organization that performs this function on behalf of the Minister of Health.  The 
Therapeutics Product Directorate will be referred to as “the Minister” in this paper on occasion.   
144 Section 4(5) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations requires all patents eligible 
for listing be submitted at the time the new drug submission is filed.  Section 4(6) allows for the additions 
of relevant patents after the filing of the new drug submission if it is done within 30 days of granting.   
145 Structural variation of molecules are often called polymorphisms.  Molecules group into crystals, and 
different chemical or physical treatment of a particular molecule can lead to different crystals (called 
polymorphs), with different characteristics.  Some polymorphs may have therapeutic effects while others 
do not.   
146 Dosage forms include suspensions, solutions (where one drug is dissolved in a liquid) tablets or capsules 
(oral solid dosage forms), tinctures (drugs dissolved in alcohol), and injections.  Dosage forms aid in 
delivering a drug to its intended site of action in the body.  They can meet the conditions for patent. 
147 Supra note 1, s 2.  See the definition of “claims” in this section of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations.   
148 See Ratiopharm v Wyeth, 2007 FC 340, [2007] FCJ 462.  This case affirmed that listed patents must be 
relevant to the drug product in question by citing Section 55.2(4) of the Patent Act (see p.14): the scope of 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations can be interpreted to include relevant patents 
under its jurisdiction.     
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 Section Five – Filing Notices of Allegation 
 Section Five of the Regulations requires that a manufacturer making an 
Abbreviated New Drug Submission for a generic medicine address the patents for the 
innovative pharmaceutical on the Patent Register.  The generic manufacturer must either 
wait for the patents on the innovator product to expire before getting a Notice of 
Compliance149 or allege that 1) the innovator’s patents are invalid, 2) the innovator’s 
patents are improperly included on the Patent Register, or 3) the innovator’s patents will 
not be infringed by the generic manufacturer.150  The section requires the generic 
manufacturer to address each relevant patent on the Patent Register and send separate 
Notices of Allegation to the innovator that outline the factual and legal details of each 
patent improperly listed.151    
 Section Six – Order of Prohibition Application and the Twenty-Four Month Stay 
 The innovator must respond to the allegations within forty-five days of receipt of 
the Notices of Allegation.152  The innovator can accept the allegations, in which case a 
Notice of Compliance will issue to the generic company, allowing them to manufacture 
and sell the generic drug.  But the innovator company usually commences an application 
for an Order of Prohibition in Federal Court to stop the Minister of Health from issuing a 
Notice of Compliance to the generic manufacturer.153  When it is filed, a twenty-four 
month stay is automatically granted,154 prohibiting the Minister of Health from issuing a 
Notice of Compliance within this period, unless the court decides in favour of the generic 
                                                          
149 Supra note 1, s (5)(1)(a). 
150 Summarized from Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, supra note 1, SOR/93-133, 
S(5)(1)(b). 
151 Supra note 1, s (5)(3).  Allegations for separate patents each require a separate Notice of Allegation.   
152 Supra note 1, s (6)(1).   
153 Ibid.   
154 Supra note 1, s (7)(1)(e).   
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company in the meantime, or the patents expire before the end of the stay.155  Therefore, 
filing for the Order of Prohibition operates as an automatic injunction to stop the approval 
of the generic.156  If the summary proceedings has not been completed within twenty-four 
months, the Minister is free to issue the Notice of Compliance.157   
 Section 7 – Conditions for Issuing a Notice of Compliance 
 Section 7 outlines the conditions that allow a Notice of Compliance to be issued, 
which include the expiration of the relevant patents, and the declaration of registered 
patents as being invalid or non-infringed.  If approval is achieved through the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, a Notice of Compliance is issued, which 
allows for the manufacture, distribution, and sale of the pharmaceutical product in 
Canada.   
 Section 8 - Damages 
 Section 8 specifies damages awarded to generics if a judicial review is lost by an 
innovator company on appeal by a generic.  The amount of damages is computed from 
the point in time when the generic could have been introduced into the market, if the 
innovator had not challenged the generic manufacturer’s allegations.   
                                                          
155 Supra note 1, s (7)(2)(a).   
156 Noted by Binnie J., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 26, 1 SCR 553 
(citing Merck Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), (1998) 2 SCR 193, (1998) 
80 CPR (3d) 368 at para 33):  
…under this procedure the court hearing the prohibition application has no discretion to lift the 
stay even if it thinks the innovator’s case for interim relief is weak.  Nor does the court have any 
discretion to leave the contending parties to their remedies under the Patent Act.  The ‘second 
person’s’ application for a NOC simply goes into a deep-freeze until the statutory procedures have 
played themselves out. 
157 Supra note 1, s (7)(1)(e).   
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Litigation Following the Notice of Allegation 
 Proceeding in a Summary Way 
 Once the innovator files the application for an Order of Prohibition, the twenty-
four-month stay is granted, and all ensuing litigation proceeds by way of judicial review 
through the Federal Court.  Section 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act158 facilitates the 
commencement of the judicial review process: 
An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal 
board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time 
the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or 
other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the 
party directly affected by it….159 
 
Rule 300(a) of the Federal Court Rules directs that all applications for judicial review are 
subject to the rules in Part 5 of the Federal Court Rules.160  Therefore, all applications for 
judicial review in questions arising from the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations are subject to Part 5, Rules 300 to 334.  Rule 300(b) reaffirms that 
“proceedings required or permitted by or under an Act of Parliament to be brought by 
application, motion, originating notice of motion, originating summons or petition are to 
be determined in a summary way….”161 
 Judicial Review Answers One Question Only  
 Rule 302 of the Federal Court Rules states that a judicial review is limited to a 
single order.  This reaffirms that the purpose of the review is to determine if the Minister 
shall be prohibited from granting the Notice of Compliance to the generic and it therefore 
                                                          
158 Federal Courts Act, Supra note 54, s 18.1(2).   
159 The first mover, the innovator company, has thirty days to apply for judicial review under the Federal 
Courts Act, but has 45 days to respond to the Notice of Allegation under Section 6(1) of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.   
160 Federal Court Rules, supra note 55, s 300(a). 
161 Ibid at 300(b).   
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cannot be a determination of patent infringement or invalidity, as this would amount to a 
second and different order.  Rule 302 promotes expediency in the process but it is the 
inability to adjudicate the validity of the patents combined with the abbreviated process 
of judicial review that creates the perception that the rules allow Canada to sidestep its 
international obligations under TRIPs and NAFTA.   
 In this context, judicial review focuses on the reasonableness of the Minister of 
Health in registering the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register in light of the 
evidence from both sides.  The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that patent validity 
cannot be adjudicated during this process in Merck Frosst v Minister of National Health 
and Welfare.162  The court appeared to also be somewhat mystified by the legislation, 
stating that the drafters must have “had in mind the possibility of there being a parallel 
proceeding instituted by the [generic] which might give rise to such a declaration and be 
binding on the parties.”163 
 Presumption of Truth of the Allegations 
 Section 6(2) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations states 
that “the court shall make an order pursuant to subsection [6](1) in respect of a patent that 
is the subject of one or more allegations if it finds that none of those allegations is 
justified.”164  Therefore, the allegations made by the generic applicant are presumed to be 
true until the innovator company proves otherwise, in which case the Notice of 
                                                          
162 Merck Frosst v. Minister of National Health and Welfare, [1994] FCJ 662, (1994) 55 CPR (3d) 302 at 
para 23.   
163 Ibid.  s 60 of the Patent Act still allows generic company to institute an action for impeachment if it feels 
that patents granted on the brand name pharmaceutical are invalid, so a parallel process is in place.   
164 Supra note 1, s 6(2).   
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Compliance will not be granted.165  If the innovator cannot cast doubt on the allegations, 
the Minister is obliged to issue the Notice of Compliance.   
 Judicial Review – Reading the Evidence 
 Since the review proceeds summarily, both sides submit evidence, briefs, 
statements by expert witnesses, and cross examinations of those witnesses, with respect 
to the particular allegations of the generic company.  The judge examines the written 
material, hears oral summary arguments, then renders a decision on whether or not the 
Minister acted reasonably when he added the patents to the Patent Register.   
 Hatch-Waxman Legislation in the United States – a Comparison to the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations 
 Linkage regulations in the United States existed for nearly ten years before they 
did in Canada.  In 1984, the United States passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.166  This legislation is 
similar to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in that both 
provide a linked process for the expeditious approval of generic pharmaceuticals.  Similar 
to the Canadian system, the generic applicant files an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application, where the applicant only must demonstrate bioequivalence to the branded 
product.  Like the corresponding Canadian regulations, all of the safety and efficacy data 
provided by the manufacturer of the innovative pharmaceutical is relied upon, which 
greatly reduces the cost of the approval process.  Also like the Canadian process, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act requires the generic manufacturer to address all of the patents for a 
                                                          
165 See Pfizer v Minister of Health, 2008 FC 11 for judicial verification of the presumption of validity in 
Notice of Compliance proceedings.   
166 Supra note 13.  Recall that this legislation is incorporated into 21 United States Code, §355(j), the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC(1994).   
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particular innovative pharmaceutical, which are listed in the United States’ Food and 
Drug Administration’s “Orange Book.”167  The generic manufacturer must specify for 
each patent that: 1) the patent has expired, 2) the patent will expire before the generic is 
approved, 3) the patent has not been filed, or 4) the patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the generic manufacturer’s actions.  The generic manufacturer must submit 
an opinion to the patent holder, called a Paragraph IV Certification, as to the legal and 
factual reasons why certain patents are invalid, or will not be infringed.   
 When an Abbreviated New Drug Application is filed with a Paragraph IV 
Certification, the generic applicant is deemed to have infringed the innovator company’s 
patents, giving it a cause of action for patent infringement.168  The innovator has 45 days 
from the receipt of the Paragraph IV Certification to file an action for infringement.169  
Once the action is filed, the Abbreviated New Drug Application is automatically stayed 
for thirty months, unless the patents expire in the meantime, or judgment is passed in the 
action to deem the patents invalid or non-infringed.170   
 Since the litigation for infringement is an action, adjudication over the validity of 
the patents is made according to the rules established in the United States Patents Act.  
This highlights the key differences between the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
                                                          
167 For any particular innovative pharmaceutical, the Orange Book lists patents for the active ingredient, the 
formulation of the innovator’s product, and the approved indication.  Patents for processes, packaging, 
metabolites, and intermediates are not listed.  The Food and Drug Administration lists the patents in the 
Orange Book, but makes no determinations as to whether the patents should be listed or not.  This is 
outlined in 59 Fed Reg 50338, 50345 (Oct 3, 1994).  This highlights the different roles of the Federal Drug 
Administration and the Office of Patented Medicines Liaison (as part of the Therapeutics Products 
Directorate of Health Canada) with respect to evaluating the patents listed, which could be a topic for 
future research.  Recall that Section Four of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations 
lists criteria for inclusion on the Patent Register in Canada.   
168 Patents, 35 USC §271(e)(2)(A)(2006).   
169 Ibid, §271(5). 
170 Supra note 166, 21 USC §355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(1994).   
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Compliance) Regulations and the Hatch-Waxman Act: the Hatch-Waxman Act links 
generic market approval and patent validity by incorporating the process of infringement 
proceedings under the Patent Act, whereas the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations only review whether or not Health Canada acted reasonably in 
including the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register.  The infringement action 
incorporated into the Hatch-Waxman Act provides both parties with the opportunity for 
full discovery, including the examination and cross examination of witnesses in person.  
It provides a binding court decision that affords equal rights of appeal for both the 
innovator and the generic company, but the legislation still allows the Food and Drug 
Administration to issue permission to market the product before an appeal.171  The 
litigation is streamlined compared to that in Canada, in that there is no secondary 
litigation process beyond the action and an appeal.  In Canada, judicial review can always 
be followed by a separate action for infringement.  This can lead to a perception that the 
judicial review process is ineffective, because it is, indeed, inconclusive on the issue of 
patent validity.   
 Length of Proceedings: Actions take longer than Summary Proceedings  
 Seeing that the average time to complete a judicial review is fourteen months,172 it 
is unlikely that a full determination of infringement or invalidity could be finalized within 
this time period, making the abbreviated process of judicial review advantageous.  In the 
                                                          
171 Supra note 166, 21 USC §355(j)(4).  This automatic approval process is similar to Section 7(e) of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, discussed earlier.   
172 Canada, Health Canada, Office of Submissions and Intellectual Property, ”Therapeutic Products 
Directorate Statistical Report 2013/2014,” File 14-1083555-86, Jul 2014, online: http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/pubs/drug-medic/patmrep_mbrevrap_2013-eng.php 
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United States, a thirty-month stay period is granted173 for infringement actions, but that 
period is often exceeded,174 so it is reasonable to expect that actions at the Federal Court 
in Canada would also take considerable time.  The complexities of a trial necessarily 
slow its progression.   
 The current judicial review process affords several provisions related to 
expediting the process in Part 5 of the Federal Court Rules: 175 
1. … an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single order in 
respect of which relief is sought.176 
2. …within 10 days after the issuance of a notice of application, the applicant 
shall serve it on (a) all respondents.177   
3. A respondent who intends to appear in respect of an application shall, within 
ten days of being served with a notice of application, serve and file a notice of 
appearance in Form 305.178   
4. Within 30 days after issuance of a notice of application, an applicant shall 
serve its supporting affidavits and documentary exhibits and file proof of 
service….179 
5.  Within 30 days after service of the applicant’s affidavits, a respondent shall 
serve its supporting affidavits and documentary exhibits and shall file proof of 
service….180 
6. Cross examinations on affidavits must be completed by all parties within 20 
days after the filing of the respondent’s affidavits….181   
7. An applicant shall serve and file the applicant’s record within 20 days after 
the day on which the parties’ cross-examinations are completed or within 20 
days after the day on which the time for those cross-examinations is expired, 
whichever day is earlier.182   
 
                                                          
173 Supra note 166, §355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(1994).  The Food and Drug approval of the generic’s submission is 
automatically stayed for the earlier of thirty months, the expiration of the relevant patents, or a judicial 
determination of invalidity or non-infringement.   
174 Patrick Smith and Frederick H. Rein, “A Discussion of Generic Drug Approval and Patent Systems in 
the United States and Canada” (2009) 25: Cdn Intel Prop Rev 83.   
175 Supra note 55 at 302 to 309.  
176 Ibid, s 302. 
177 Ibid, s 304.   
178 Ibid, s 305.   
179 Ibid, s 306.   
180 Ibid, s 307. 
181 Ibid, s 308. 
182 Ibid, s 309(1). 
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Therefore, the rules in Part 5 set out specific time frames in order to keep the judicial 
review process moving along efficiently.  For actions initiated in Federal Court, the rules 
in Part 4 of the Federal Court Rules apply, and have similar timelines established in 
Regulations 203 to 207,183  but because the proceedings include a trial, the rules are more 
extensive, covering the pleadings, rules for the statement of claim, rules for counterclaim, 
preliminary objections, motion rules, discovery, evidence rules, expert witness rules, and 
trial rules.  Undoubtedly, pursuing a trial, with discovery and live witnesses will increase 
the time for adjudication.  In addition, an action can encompass a complete statement of 
claim for infringement and a counterclaim for impeachment, so there can be multiple 
issues during the trial, lengthening the process.  In contrast, the judicial review process 
adjudicates one question only, that being the reasonableness of the decision made by 
Health Canada to list the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register.184  Switching to an 
infringement action would therefore require a lengthening of the prohibition time from 
twenty-four months to thirty months, as under Hatch-Waxman, or to some length of time 
that fits with the expected duration of the trial.185     
   The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
 As a signatory to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Agreement,186 Canada is obliged to comply with the protection given to patent holders 
under the agreement.  The complaint brought forward by the European Communities and 
                                                          
183 Ibid, s 203 to 207.   
184 Federal Court Rules, supra note 55 at S 302, and Merck Frosst v Minister of National Health and 
Welfare, supra note 162.   
185 See Appendix Four for an overview of how proceedings under the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations could have proceeded by way of an action instead of judicial review.   
186 Supra note 4, [TRIPS].     
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their Member States in 1997187 alleged that Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations do not provide adequate protection for patent holders, since the 
legislation provided an opportunity for generic manufacturers to challenge a patent 
holder’s rights through the judicial review process, which, as mentioned, does not 
encompass a full action, and has unequal appeal rights.  The European Union alleged that 
the imposition of these Regulations meant that holders of pharmaceutical patents were 
treated less favourably than patent holders in other industries.  Through the abbreviated 
process of judicial review, a generic manufacturer could be issued a Notice of 
Compliance, even though the patent holder still has patent rights conferred under the 
Patent Act.  The European Member States stated that the rules that allowed Canada to 
treat pharmaceutical patent holders less favourably than patent holders in other industries, 
and was therefore in violation of Article 27.1, which states that  
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.188   
 
 However, the opposite view of Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations was taken by Canada – the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations provide additional protection of the patent holder’s rights for 
the term of the patent, and only allow for a Notice of Compliance of a generic challenger 
                                                          
187 Supra note 5.  The panel did rule on the issue of the abbreviated process, but the primary 
recommendations were related to the experimental and regulatory use exemption and the stockpiling 
provisions.  The experimental use provision allows competitors of patents to begin developing the 
competitive product before the expiration of the patents.  The stockpiling provisions allow a generic 
manufacturer to manufacture and stockpile inventory of a generic medicine, but not sell it until the relevant 
patents expire.   
188 Supra note 4 at art 27.1.   
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if it has been reasonably determined that the patents held were not applicable to the 
original drug product.  The World Trade Organization decision panel agreed, stating 
In further examining the Canadian laws currently in force, one could see that they 
even went beyond the TRIPS Agreement by protecting, in addition, the rights of 
pharmaceutical patent holders through the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, which ensured and enhanced the realization of the 
exclusive rights during the term of the patent.189 
 
Despite the report of the panel, Canada could adjust the Regulations to be similar to 
Hatch-Waxman, where the infringement action is automatically triggered when the 
Notices of Allegation are filed, as this would make Canada’s linkage laws align with 
Hatch-Waxman, preventing future conflict.  However, complaints about the process are 
not necessarily warranted.  Judges review the cases and determine if Health Canada acted 
appropriately when it decided to disallow certain patents to hold up the generic approval 
process, and there is no clear evidence that this cannot be done accurately, and separately, 
from assessing infringement.190   
Burden of Proof in a Summary Proceedings  
 The burden of proof is the onus on one litigant to establish the merits of the case 
brought to the court.  The burden of proof for refuting the allegations made by the generic 
company about the invalidity of the innovator’s patents is borne by the party that brought 
the application for an Order of Prohibition, which is the patent holder, who becomes the 
“mover” or the “first person.”   
 The burden is established in Rule 301(e) of the Federal Court Rules, which states 
that the applicant must include with its application “a complete and concise statement of 
                                                          
189 Supra note 5 at p 116.   
190 As discussed, further research on the decision making patterns of these cases at the Federal Court may 
provide insight into whether or not this is problematic, but there are potentially thousands of cases.  
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the grounds intended to be argued, including a reference to any statutory provision or rule 
to be relied on.”191  This was affirmed in Frosst Canada Inc. et al v Canada (Minister of 
National Health and Welfare),192 that a party moving under Section 6 of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations was judged to bear the burden of proof in 
the proceedings.  At the commencement of the proceedings, the judge therefore presumes 
that the allegations made by the generic about patent invalidity are true (as discussed 
above), and the patent holder must demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
allegations in the Notices of Allegation are not justified.  Therefore, the patent holder 
bears the legal burden of establishing why his patents are valid by directing arguments 
against the allegations in the Notices of Allegation. The filer of the Notices of Allegation, 
the generic company, holds the evidential burden, which is the provision of evidence of 
patent invalidity in that notice.  In Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v Canada (Minister of 
National Health and Welfare), the Federal Court of Appeal summarized the burden of 
proof: 
The initial burden of proof is known, in a civil case, as the persuasive burden or 
the legal burden and it is the burden of establishing a case to the civil standard of 
proof. By contrast, the evidential burden consists of a burden of putting an issue 
in play and means that a party has the responsibility to ensure that there is 
sufficient evidence of the existence or non-existence of a fact or an issue on the 
record to pass the threshold for that particular fact or issue.193 
 
This affirms that the generic company produces the evidence of invalidity or non-
infringement, while the innovator company bears the legal burden to refute the evidence 
                                                          
191 Supra note 55, s 301(e).  According to David Tait, a lawyer who specializes in patent litigation with 
McCarthy Tétrault, the Notice of Allegation often just states that the patents are invalid, with no details, 
leaving the innovator company to establish a broader defence of its patents.   
192 Supra note 162, at para 23. 
193 [1996] FCJ 1333, [1996] 70 CPR (3d) 206 at para 8.   
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in a judicial review.  The generic manufacturer would bear a legal burden for a separate 
action where the innovator is claiming infringement in a patent action, but not in this 
case, where it is applying for a judicial review under the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations.  This is the statutory burden of proof created in the Federal 
Court Rules, section 301(e).   
 If the legislation was instead drafted to be an infringement action, the generic 
manufacturer would be deemed to have infringed, and therefore bear the legal burden, 
consistent with the rules for an action and Canada’s Patent Act.  The presumption of 
validity in section 43(2) of the Patent Act, states that “After the patent is issued, it shall, 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be valid and avail the patent holder and 
the legal representatives of the patent holder for the term mentioned in section 44 or 45, 
whichever is applicable.”194  The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations reverse this onus, so that the patent holder defends its previously issued 
patents.   
 Judicial Review – the Standard of Review 
 The judicial review process is a summary proceeding which operates to oversee 
areas of administrative law, like decisions to list patents on the Patent Register, made by 
the Therapeutic Products Directorate’s Office of Patented Medicines Liaison (a branch of 
the Therapeutic Products Directorate of Health Canada).  The judge renders a decision, 
whether on the balance of probabilities, the allegations are justified.   The innovator 
attempts to demonstrate that Health Canada acted reasonably when it decided to include 
                                                          
194Supra note 66, s 43(2).   
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the patents on the Patent Register, making the allegations of the generic manufacturer 
unreasonable.   
 The standard of review under the original Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations was “patent and reasonable.”  The determination of the 
standard of review of patent and reasonableness or correctness in a judicial review of a 
Notice of Compliance application was affirmed in Ferring Inc. v Canada (Minister of 
Health),195 where the Court determined that the standard of review was correctness for 
questions of law, and patent and reasonableness for questions of fact, referring to Astra-
Zeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health).196  Where there was mixed questions 
of law and fact, Richard C.J. stated that “the standard of review is patent and 
reasonableness unless the question of law is extricable from the question of fact in which 
case the question of law is determined on the basis of correctness.”197  Since legal rules 
were being applied to factual evidence regarding patents on the Patent Register, the 
standard of review was appropriately patent and reasonable.   
 Decisions made by way of judicial review, where the standard of review was 
deemed to be patent and reasonable, was changed to “reasonableness” by Dunsmuir v 
New Brunswick.198  Pharmascience Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) affirmed the 
applicability of the standard of review for new drug submissions under the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations:   
                                                          
195 [2007] FCA 276, [2007] FCJ 1138.   
196 [2004] FC 1277, at para 33. 
197 Ibid at para 7, 8.   
198 The test for reasonableness is described in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190, 2008 SCC 9 
at 47.  Three of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases had been decided by the time the 
standard was changed.  Addressing the impact of the change on the cases may be a point for future 
research.   
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 A decision by the Minister of Health to accept or reject a new drug submission is 
 a question of mixed fact and law. Accordingly, such a decision will be reviewed 
 on the standard of reasonableness, where the issues involve both fact and law.199   
 
This affirmed that the judge conducting a judicial review over the issuance of a Notice of 
Compliance to a generic manufacturer gives the Office of Patented Medicines Liaison 
significant deference when making a decision about including patents on the Patent 
Register.  If the allegation by the generic company involves patent invalidity, the judge 
may in fact consider evidence in relation to the Patent Act as well as patent jurisprudence 
to decide the validity of patent claims, but the judgment will fall short of assessing actual 
patent infringement, which can only be determined through an infringement proceeding 
under the regular trial process, where the standard of review is correctness.  Therefore, 
the standard of reasonableness applies to applications for judicial review of decisions to 
grant a Notice of Compliance, where deference is given to the Minister’s decision for 
inclusion on the Patent Register.  An actual determination of patent validity would occur 
under the standard of review of correctness.   
 In Abbott Laboratories Limited v Attorney General of Canada (Minister of 
Health), Justice Hughes confirmed the standard of review: 
Given that we are in a post-Dunsmuir environment, a standard of patent 
unreasonableness no longer can apply.  However, on the standard of 
reasonableness, considerable deference still should be given to decisions of the 
Minister where the questions are those of mixed fact and law as well as those of 
fact alone. 
In summary:  
1. Patent claim construction is a matter of law to be reviewed on a standard of 
correctness.  
2. The uses approved by the existing Notice of Compliance are questions of fact 
and are to be reviewed on this basis of reasonableness with considerable 
deference given to the Minister’s decision.  
3. The consideration as to how the uses claimed in the patent compare with those 
approved by the Notice of Compliance for purposes of section 4(2)(d) of the 
                                                          
199 Pharmascience Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 2008 FCA 258, [2008] FCJ 1269 at para 5. 
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Notice of Compliance Regulations involves mixed fact and law and considerable 
deference should be given to the Minister’s decision.200 
 
The applicability of reasonableness as the standard of review meshes with the 
determinations that are made by the Office of Patented Medicines Liaison at Health 
Canada.  Since Health Canada is determining the suitability of medicines for treating 
specific diseases, it is Health Canada, as the evaluator of the facts that will allow the use 
of the medicine for specific conditions, and its personnel have the appropriate 
background for doing so.  Even though the patents involved claim a use (usually based on 
the doctrine of sound prediction), the actual use becomes the medical conditions for 
which the medication is approved by Health Canada, and upon which the Notice of 
Compliance is issued to the innovator.  It is therefore the factual evidence provided in 
support of that actual use, applied to those particular patents upon which the approved 
clinical use is based that becomes the decision making points for Health Canada in 
determining whether a patent should be listed on the Patent Register.201  It is not making 
outright determinations of patent validity, which makes the judicial review process 
suitable.   
                                                          
200 Abbott Laboratories v Canada (Minister of Health), (2008) FC 700, [2007] FCJ 543.  Section 4(2)(d) 
states that “A patent on a patent list in relation to a new drug submission is eligible to be added to the 
register if the patent contains…(d) a claim for the use of the medicinal ingredient, and the use has been 
approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in respect of the submission.”   
201 When innovator pharmaceutical companies apply for patents on drug molecules, they have a theory and 
some empirical evidence from experimentation as to what health problem the molecule will treat, but they 
often do not have specific evidence, since all research at this point is at the molecular level.  Allowing for 
such utility is accomplished through the doctrine of sound prediction, where the patent applicant is allowed 
to “soundly predict” what the utility of the molecule may potentially be.  When patents are to be added to 
Health Canada’s Patent Register, the uses claimed must relate to the official therapeutic uses claimed in the 
application for a Notice of Compliance.   
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Rights of Appeal 
 If a patent holder loses the judicial review at the Federal Court, the Notice of 
Compliance is granted, and there is no chance of an effective appeal for the patent holder, 
as the Minister of Health must issue the Notice of Compliance to the generic company 
through Section 7(2)(b), which states that the Minister must not withhold a Notice of 
Compliance if the court has declared that the patents are not valid, or would not be 
infringed.  If the allegations are dismissed, the generic company has the right to appeal 
the decision to the Federal Court of Appeal for further judicial review, and possibly to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.202   
 Even if a patent holder has an unfavorable judgment from the judicial review, it 
does not stop the patent holder from filing a separate action for infringement.  At this 
point, however, the generic company is not prohibited from selling the generic drug, and 
the patent holder suffers a massive erosion in the market share of its innovative drug203 
because of the price difference.  It may also be difficult for the patent holder to get an 
injunction to stop the sale of the generic, since the judge will know that the summary 
proceedings determined that the patents should not have been registered on the Patent 
Register administered by Health Canada.  Therefore, the judge may refrain from forming 
an opinion and making an injunction.  This loss of an effective appeal also differentiates 
                                                          
202 The cases emanating from Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations heard at the 
Supreme Court of Canada were listed in Table One, Chapter One.  A qualitative analysis of the cases is 
presented in Chapter Six.     
203 The profits can be reclaimed as damages through Section 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, but the law on damages is unclear when a determination of patent infringement 
has been made following a successful application for judicial review by a generic manufacturer and the 
granting of a Notice of Compliance.   
68 
 
 
the judicial review process under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations from an infringement action under the Patent Act.204     
 The appeal rights between the patent holder and the generic challenger are 
illustrated in Figure One, which shows the outcomes for each party when different 
decisions are handed down at different levels of court.  The dashed arrows represent 
avenues where a summary proceedings under the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations has finished, but the patent holder still has an opportunity for 
initiating a new action for patent infringement. 
  
                                                          
204 As discussed earlier, the United States’ Hatch-Waxman Act does not hold up the approval process for a 
generic medicine once the initial challenge is lost either. 
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Figure 1: Summary of Litigation Proceeding from PM(NOC) Regulations 
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Chapter Five: A Review of Relevant Decision Making Studies 
 The first step in establishing the direction for future research on the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations will be to document the decision making 
patterns in the cases and compare them to the Supreme Court patent case data, the 
copyright data, as well as the general Supreme Court decision making data.  Previous 
decision making studies on the Supreme Court come from authors Donald Songer,205 
Julia Siripurapu,206  Peter McCormick,207 Emmett Macfarlane,208 and Christine Joseph.209  
Songer and Siripurapu studied unanimous decisions at the Supreme Court between 1970 
and 2003, with an emphasis on the period of 1982 to 2003, a period of new Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms activity at the Supreme Court.  McCormick’s contributions came 
through two publications, one of which provides data on unanimity at the Supreme 
Court210 while the other provides data and analysis of concurring reasons at the Supreme 
Court between 1984 and 2006.211  Macfarlane also studied unanimity at the Supreme 
Court, but focussed his research on interviews with Supreme Court Justices (current and 
retired), law clerks of the Justices, and other staff members.  Joseph performed a 
comprehensive study of solo dissents at the Supreme Court, covering all of the 133 solo 
dissents between 1974 and 2003.   
                                                          
205 Donald Songer is a professor of political science at the University of South Carolina.  
206 Julia Siripurapu is an American lawyer at Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popeo Law Firm in 
Boston, Massachusetts.   
207 Peter McCormick is a professor of political science at the University of Lethbridge. 
208 Emmett Macfarlane was a postdoctoral fellow and visiting researcher at Harvard University when he 
studied Supreme Court unanimity.  He is currently an assistant professor of political science at the 
University of Waterloo.   
209 Christine Joseph prepared her research note on solo dissents while pursuing her LL.B at the University 
of Victoria.   
210 Peter McCormick, “Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) Osgoode Hall LJ Vol 42 Number 1 Article 3, 100 – 138.    
211 Peter McCormick, Supra note 34 at Table 1, 144.   
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 However, the purpose of these previous studies was not to develop a pattern of 
decision making for comparison to other cases.  Rather, the purpose of these articles was 
to try to determine what forces were driving judges to make decisions.  My study moves 
away from looking for blanket reasons as to why the decisions of the Justices across the 
Supreme Court are made in the manner they are.  Rather, the current study examines the 
relative decision making patterns among different categories of cases at the Supreme 
Court.  This alleviates the need to point to political beliefs or the agendas of the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice.  Instead the decision making patterns of various categories of cases 
are compared relative to each other, in an attempt to find specific reasons as to why the 
patterns are similar or different.  The exercise starts with a description of the types of 
cases, and their similarities and differences, which can provide some insight into why 
their patterns are the same or different.   
 Decision Making Studies Focussing on Judicial Attitudes  
 Early studies of decision making that attempted to link the political ideology and 
attitudes of judges to their judicial outcomes include: Schubert (1965),212 Peck (1969),213 
Rohde and Spaeth (1976),214 and Segal and Spaeth (1993, 1996, 2002).215  Robertson, and 
Segal and Spaeth were particularly adamant in their studies that political attitudes 
                                                          
212Schubert, Glendon. 1965. The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 
1946–1963. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
213 Peck, Sidney R. 1969. “A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1958–1967.” In 
Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Studies of Political Decision Making in 
the East and West, ed. Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski. New York: Oxford University Press. 
214 Robertson, David. 1998. Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
215 Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1996. “The Influence of 
Stare Decisis on the Votes of the United States Supreme Court Justices.” American Journal of Political 
Science 40: 971–1003, Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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represent a complete explanation for the voting behaviour of the Supreme Court Justices, 
but recent scholarship has challenged the assertion that political attitudes are the sole 
driving force behind judicial voting.  For example, Emmett Macfarlane categorizes 
decision making studies into three main groups: studies focusing on overt political 
appointment process of judges, studies focusing on a tendency for political deference 
among judges, including a strong belief in parliamentary supremacy, and studies focusing 
on “strong norms of behaviour [that] govern the collegial and collaborative nature of 
those institutions and help to determine the relative level of consensus they achieve.”216  
It is the third category, the strong norms of behavior at the Supreme Court that 
Macfarlane attributes to a high degree of unanimity of the decisions in the court.217   
 McCormick found that the average rate of unanimous decision making, from 1970 
to 2002, was 63 percent.  Macfarlane, studying this result, concluded that the high rate of 
unanimity was the result of “a natural by-product of the institution’s norms and 
processes, rather than as an overt goal of the justices.”218  Of these norms, Macfarlane 
states that the Chief Justice has a major impact on the degree of consensus of the Court, 
and states that one of Chief Justice McLachlan’s major goals as the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court was to increase the consensus of the Court.219  Such statements try to 
move decision making studies into the realm of the absolute – looking for reasons or 
phenomena that can explain the nature of the patterns of decisions found.  However, the 
                                                          
216 Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 SCLR (2d) 
379 at 380.   
217 The degree of unanimity at the Supreme Court was determined by Peter McCormick to be 63.7 percent 
between 1970 and 2002, in “Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) Osgoode Hall LJ Vol 42 Number 1 Article 3, at 107.        
218 Supra note 216 at 383.  
219 Supra note 216, Macfarlane quoting Cristin Schmitz, “Communication, Consensus Among McLachlin’s 
Targets,” (November 19, 1999), 19(27) The Lawyers Weekly.   
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current study does not seek an absolute answer as to what underlying principles are 
affecting judicial decision making; it seeks to compare the patterns, using the previous 
studies as the data for the comparison.     
 Concurrences at the Supreme Court 
 Concurring decisions are separate reasons written by a judge or group of judges 
who agree with the outcome of a case, but for different reasons than the majority.  In a 
study of cases from 1984 to 2006, McCormick found that concurrences were a regular 
part of the Supreme Court’s decision making process.  The incidence of concurring 
reasons peaked in 1995 and 1996,220 and then began a slow but steady decline.  He 
attributed the peak to the high instance of Charter cases before the Supreme Court:  
Dynamic period of flux and change has come to an end…[as] most of the major 
questions [raised by the Charter] have been answered; as a result, fewer “big” 
questions are coming before the Court, and few policy-divergent responses need 
to be generated to prepare the field within which these can be managed.221 
 
The average rate of concurring decisions over the entire period was 36 percent.222  
McCormick asserts that “divided decisions demonstrate that a court that is both open to a 
variety of arguments and willing to change its mind over time.”223  
 Dissent 
 Over the period of 1974 to 2003, Joseph studied the solo dissent rates of the 
individual Justices,224 as well as the overall rates of solo dissent.  She argues that “the 
                                                          
220 Supra note 34 at p 206.  There were 75 concurrences in 43 cases in this one year period.    
221 Supra note 34 at p 166.  Also cited by Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 75.   
222 Supra note 34.  This is calculated as the total number of concurrences in the period (610) over the total 
number of cases for the same period (1710).   
223 Supra note 34 at p 166, citing to MT Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A 
Theory of Dissent”, SSRN (1 April 2008), U of Chicago Law & Economics, Online Working Paper No. 
363; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 186 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019074 
224 Christine Joseph, “All but One: Solo Dissents on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2006) 44 
Osgoode Hall LJ 501.  The individual rates of solo dissent are included in Table 14, p 518.     
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exercise of solo dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada is judicial disagreement at its 
apex - a single judge sitting on the highest court in the nation breaking away from his or 
her colleagues who have purportedly ‘gotten it wrong.’”225  She found that the overall 
rate of dissent rose during this period to 6.3 percent of cases by the end of the study 
period.226  She found that the McLachlin Court in 2003 had the highest rate of solo 
dissents, but also had the lowest rate of disagreement, at 34 percent, but she could not 
extrapolate this data to a relationship between the overall level of disagreement of the 
Court and the likelihood of a solo dissent.  Joseph’s data showed that the incidence of 
solo dissents increases as the panel size moves from five to seven, but decreases as it 
moves from seven to nine.   
 “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” by Margaret Ann 
Wilkinson 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson’s chapter, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s 
Copyright Cases,”227 in The Copyright Pentalogy, represented the first time decision 
making in Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases had been tabulated, and also marked 
a departure from the general decision making studies of the past that dealt with general 
reasons to explain the pattern of decision making. The objective of her study was to 
analyze the most recent eleven Supreme Court of Canada copyright judgments and 
compare the decision making pattern in these cases to the pattern of decisions in general 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.  Five of the cases were simultaneously released 
                                                          
<https://litigationessentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/p?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&srctype=smi&s
rcid=3B15&doctype=cite&docid=44+Osgoode+Hall+L.J.+501&key=299ecfb0f32298b94e94916eba8f068
2>; 175 dissents of all types were reported between January 2000 and October 2007.    
225 Ibid at 501.   
226 In 2003, at the end of the period, the Chief Justice was Beverly McLachlin.     
227 Supra note 18.   
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by the Supreme Court in the summer of 2012, just before Royal Assent of the new 
Copyright Modernization Act,228 greatly enlarging the relatively small amount of 
Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence.  An analysis at this point seemed relevant, as the 
decision making pattern may evolve with the modernization of the legislation, so the 
current data would serve as a good reference point for future research.   
Wilkinson noted a difference in the pattern, which revealed that the nature of 
copyright jurisprudence in Canada has been different from the overall pattern of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence.  Wilkinson suggested that the Supreme Court Justices must have 
had some degree of difficulty in deciding these cases, citing that Canada’s existing 
copyright law existed before digital music, but had to be applied to modern digital 
copyright issues.   Wilkinson concluded that the low rate of unanimous decision making 
in the study suggests that copyright law is in a more dynamic position, similar to that of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, when Charter 
cases were flooding the Court docket.  In addition, the lack of solo dissents indicated that 
copyright law was dynamic and complicated, requiring the members of the Supreme 
Court to discuss their viewpoints together and consider policy-based responses to 
copyright law questions.229  In other words, the law was too complex for some of the 
judges to form their own opinions.   
A valid comparison of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case decision 
making patterns heard at the Supreme Court to Wilkinson’s work on copyright decisions 
can be made.  Six patent-related cases heard by the Supreme Court since the early 1990’s 
arose from disputes involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
                                                          
228 Supra note 35.   
229 Supra note 18 at p 86.   
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Regulations,230 which apply to both drug companies and government (Health Canada) 
when making decisions about approving generic pharmaceuticals for public use.  These 
Supreme Court cases originated from applications for judicial review heard at Federal 
Court, and so did the copyright cases examined by Professor Wilkinson.  Therefore, a 
similarity in the decision making pattern between the two sets of cases may provide some 
clues that something within the judicial review process itself is problematic.   
The complaints filed by the European Communities and their Member States231 
with the World Trade Organization about the circumvention of patent rights established 
in TRIPS232 by the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is essentially  
a complaint about the abbreviated process of judicial review.  As such, a determination of 
the core issues in these cases at the Supreme Court, whether it be an actual issue over 
patent or an administrative law issue related to the judicial review process itself, should 
be undertaken so that an accurate characterization of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations can be made for the purposes of assessing the Regulations’ 
compliance with Canada’s international obligations for intellectual property.  Without 
evidence that this sidestepping is leading to incorrect judicial outcomes, the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could be viewed as the opposite:  
enhancing patent protection by providing a process for evaluating patents over and above 
existing patent legislation.   
The comparison to Wilkinson’s copyright data will provide insight into this issue, 
as these eleven cases also arose following applications for judicial review at the Federal 
                                                          
230 Supra note 1, SOR/93-133 [PM(NOC), or PM(NOC) Regulations, or “the Regulations”].   
231 Supra note 5.   
232 Supra note 4.   
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Court of Appeal from decisions made by Canada’s Copyright Board.  It will help to 
characterize the decision making patterns in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases, in an attempt to demonstrate whether they lead to increased 
disagreement among the Justices, where such disagreement could translate into 
international disagreement over the level of patent protection afforded to pharmaceutical 
patent holders in Canada.233   
   
  
                                                          
233 As discussed, the comparison of the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases to 
the Supreme Court patent cases and general Supreme Court jurisprudence will also help to characterize the 
cases.  For example, a high degree of unanimity could characterize the cases as easily decided by the 
Justices.   
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Chapter Six: Data and Analysis 
 Introduction  
 Chapters Three and Four provided an overview of patented (innovative) 
medicines, generic medicines, the drug approval process in Canada, and the interplay 
among health, patent, and administrative law in the approval of generic medicines.  
Chapter Four also examined aspects of judicial review, and how they operate within the 
context of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and why they may 
be problematic.  The highlight of these elements is significant, as the comparison to the 
copyright cases in this chapter may re-direct research toward them if similarities in the 
decision making patterns of these cases exists.   
 To answer the three central questions of the thesis, the study in this chapter will 
compare the decision making data in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases to the Supreme Court patent cases, to the Supreme Court copyright cases, and to 
Supreme Court cases generally.  These comparisons will help to characterize the 
decisions in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases like one of the existing 
study groups, or as its own unique set.  This characterization is useful, since a similar 
character of patent cases to the copyright cases suggests that future research should focus 
on the elements of judicial review and their application to the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulations discussed in Chapter Four.  A dissimilarity provides 
evidence that the use of judicial review in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases is not problematic, in the sense that the judicial review process is not hampering the 
evaluation of the patents in question for the purpose of approving generic medicines.  If 
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the pattern is similar to that of the patent cases or the general Supreme Court cases, this 
provides additional support for the conclusion that judicial review is not problematic.   
 Patent Data 
 All patent cases between 1970 and 2012 were compiled through an electronic 
search on Lexis Nexis.  The following Boolean search was conducted: “patent and not 
letters patent and not patently and not patent unreasonableness and not Crown patent.”  
323 results were achieved, which were divided into 141 Supreme Court of Canada 
Judgements and 182 Supreme Court of Canada Rulings on Applications.  The 141 
judgement results were examined, and eighteen cases that covered an aspect of patent law 
in Canada were selected.  “Noting up” on these eighteen cases yielded eleven other 
Supreme Court of Canada patent cases for a total of 30, which included the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  The Supreme Court cases that primarily deal 
with the Patent Act, between 1970 and November, 2014, and the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases, between 1998 and 2015 are in Appendix Two.234  All 
motions were excluded.  Celgene Corp v Canada (Attorney General)235 was included, 
even though the primary issue was the importation of a medicine manufactured outside of 
Canada, and the applicability of provisions of the Patent Act, as opposed to a statutory 
interpretation issue with the Patent Act or an act of infringement or impeachment, which 
would necessarily involve applying the Patent Act.236    
                                                          
234 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations were implemented in 1993, so all cases 
heard were after this, making the study period for these cases significantly shorter.   
235 [2011] 1 SCR 3, 2011 SCJ 1.   
236 As one case out of thirty, the inclusion or exclusion of this case has little bearing on the comparisons 
drawn to Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.   
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 From 1970 to the present, there have been thirty patent cases at the Supreme 
Court, out of a total of four hundred cases.237  The subset of patent cases chosen is not a 
statistical sample – it represents the entire population of patent cases at the Supreme 
Court during this period.238  Of these twenty-nine cases, six cases deal specifically with 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  Appendix Two lists all of 
the patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases by citation, panel size, 
issue, and industry.  Appendix Three contains the comprehensive decision making data 
for all of the Supreme Court patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases 
since 1970.  Although there were twenty-nine patent cases overall, two separate 
judgments were made in Monsanto ’04 for two distinct questions,239 so Monsanto ’04 is 
considered as two separate cases in the data, for a total of thirty.     
 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Data 
 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases were extracted from the 
overall patent data cases in Appendix Two and are presented separately in Table Two.  
  
                                                          
237 The total number of cases in this period is determined by visiting the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
judgment website, Judgments at the Supreme Court of Canada, at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/2014/nav_date.do.  The total number of cases can be totalled by year over the period of 1970 to 
2015.   
238 Consideration must be given to what happens to the data if one group of cases is large enough to create a 
different pattern of judgements among the remaining cases.  In this type of research, the researcher should 
re-check the proportions of each decision after removing the category of interest to examine how the 
remaining data is affected.   
239 The first significant question involved the validity of a patent on a gene for a genetically engineered 
variation of canola.  The second significant question was whether or not Schmeiser infringed the patent on 
the gene for the canola by planting the resulting seeds.   
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Table 2: The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases  
Case Panel 
Size 
Drug in 
Question 
Issue Decision 
Merck-Frosst 
Canada Inc. v 
Canada (Minister 
of National 
Health and 
Welfare)240   
7 Norfloxacin 
(brand name: 
Noroxin) 
Filing procedure for a 
Notice of Allegation; 
sublicencing under a 
compulsory licencing 
regime 
Unanimous 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v Canada 
(Attorney 
General)241  
9 Paclitaxel (a 
naturally 
occurring 
substance) 
Bioequivalence; 
Interpretation of 
S.5(1.1) is a legal 
issue, so standard of 
review is correctness  
Majority with 
dissent (not 
solo) 
AstraZeneca 
Canada Inc. v 
Canada (Minister 
of Health)242 
9 Omeprazole 
capsules 
(brand name: 
Losec) 
Listing of new patents 
for a drug that the 
innovator company 
withdrew from the 
market (Losec) 
Unanimous 
Apotex Inc. v 
Sanofi-
Synthelabo 
Canada Inc.243  
7 Clopidogrel 
(brand name: 
Plavix) 
Novelty and 
obviousness: mirror 
image of intended 
molecule is patentable 
Unanimous 
Teva Canada Ltd 
v Pfizer Canada 
Inc.244 
9 Sildenafil 
(brand name: 
Viagra) 
Sufficiency of 
disclosure of patent; 
obviousness; utility 
Unanimous 
Sanofi-Aventis v 
Apotex Inc.245 
9 Ramipril 
(brand name: 
Altace) 
Damages 
Unanimous 
 
The decision making pattern of the patent cases and Patent Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases is summarized from Appendix Three in Table Three.  The patent 
cases are presented with and without the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases.   
                                                          
240 [1998] 2 SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-Frosst].   
241 [2005] 1 SCR 533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-Myers].   
242 [2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 [Astra-Zeneca]. 
243 [2008] 3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-Synthelabo]. 
244 [2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60 [Teva].   
245 [2015] SCC 20 [Sanofi-Aventis].    
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Table 3: Decision Making Patterns in Supreme Court Patent Cases and Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases – As a Percentage of the Total Number of Cases 
in each Type 
 Patent Cases 
(with PM(NOC) 
Cases) 
Patent Cases 
(without 
PM(NOC) Cases) 
PM(NOC) Cases 
Unanimous 22/30 (73%) 18/24 (75%) 83% 
Majority with 
concurring reasons 
and no dissent 
1/30 (3.0%) 1/24 (4.2%) 0% 
Majority judgments 
with no concurring 
reasons and at least 
one dissent (any 
type) 
6/30 (20%) 5/24 (21%) 1/6 (17%) 
Majority with 
concurring reasons 
and any dissent 
0% 0% 0% 
Multiple majority 
with dissent 
0% 0% 0% 
Majority judgments 
with unanimous 
dissent 
6/30 (17%) 5/24 (21%) 1/6 (17%) 
Judgments with 
non-unanimous 
dissent 
1/30 (3.0%) 1/24(4.2%) 0% 
Judgments with solo 
dissents 
1/30 (3.0%) 1/24 (4.2%) 0% 
Total number of 
Cases246 
30 24 6 
 
The data demonstrates that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have a 
decision making pattern that is very similar to the patent cases overall.  In addition, the 
removal of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases from the overall patent 
data does not significantly affect the pattern in the patent data.  This is important, since it 
demonstrates that the removal of these cases for analysis preserves the existing data, so 
                                                          
246 Monsanto ’04 is counted as two cases since there are two separate issues, each with its own set of 
judgments.   
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that observations about the patent data can be made independently of the extracted data.  
For subsequent comparisons, the patent data without the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases will be used.  
 Overall, there is a high degree of unanimity with very few concurring reasons 
with the majority.  Dissent was dissected in several ways to help illuminate any patterns 
that might exist in the data.  Dissent was examined as all types together, unanimous 
dissent, non-unanimous dissent (which could include multiple dissents, any of which 
could have been written by a solo judge), and solo dissents.  Overall, the level of dissent 
is small, with one solo dissent in one patent case.  
 A Qualitative Examination of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Cases 
 Now that the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases heard at the 
Supreme Court of Canada have been isolated, it is pertinent to briefly examine their core 
issues.  Two of the cases, Merck-Frosst and Astra-Zeneca, involved issues that were 
more procedure-oriented than science-oriented.  In Merck-Frosst, it was deemed that a 
generic company could purchase a raw ingredient from another company that had already 
received a Notice of Compliance for that ingredient, and not infringe on the patent.  In 
this case, Novopharm had acquired a compulsory licence to buy the active ingredient 
norfloxacin247 before the compulsory licensing regime was removed from the Patent Act 
in 1993.  Novopharm could produce norfloxacin tablets for sale in foreign markets, but 
the compulsory licence restricted them from selling it in Canada.  Apotex began buying 
the norfloxacin from Novopharm so it could make its own copy of the antibiotic for sale 
                                                          
247 Norfloxacin is an antibiotic.  The trade name of Merck-Frosst’s innovative product was Noroxin.   
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in the Canadian market.  Apotex was seeking a Notice of Compliance for norfloxacin, but 
Merck-Frosst applied for an Order of Prohibition under the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, citing that Apotex’s purchase of norfloxacin was a 
“sublicence” from Novopharm.  Apotex’s argument was that it was not a sublicence from 
Novopharm, and it was therefore not infringing on the patent.  The judgment is specific 
to Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases since compulsory licencing and the 
issuance of a Notice of Compliance is specific to drug product approval in Canada, with 
its own regulations about the transference of substances from one company to another 
that have met the approval criteria.248   
 The Astra-Zeneca case dealt with the issue of listing new patents on a drug that 
Astra-Zeneca had withdrawn from the Canadian market, but the company still wanted to 
block the introduction of generics of that withdrawn product.  In this case, Astra-Zeneca 
was the producer of Losec,249 a drug used to suppress acid production in the 
gastrointestinal tract, for the purposes of treating various illnesses where a reduction in 
gastric acid production is warranted.  Astra-Zeneca’s original product was formulated as 
a capsule, but the company had subsequently formulated a tablet of the same drug to be 
released on the Canadian market before the expiry of the patents on the original capsule 
product, in an attempt to switch consumers to the new product and retain its market share.  
After the withdrawal of the omeprazole capsule, Astra-Zeneca listed two new patents for 
that product on Health Canada’s Patent Register, in an attempt to block the generic 
                                                          
248 A secondary issue in this case was whether or not Apotex’s Notice of Allegation was justified, since the 
notice was filed on April 19, 1993, but Novopharm’s compulsory licence did not permit it to produce 
norfloxacin until July 2, 1993.   
249 The generic name of the molecule in Losec is omeprazole.  Future references to generic pharmaceutical 
names will be in parentheses following the trade name of the medicine.     
85 
 
 
company Apotex from copying the original molecule.  However, the patents were never 
incorporated into the actual product.  The case centered on the issue of whether or not 
Apotex was required to file Notices of Allegations as required by section 5(1) of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations for the patents listed when the 
drug was approved for sale by Health Canada, or if it had to file Notices of Allegations 
for the newer patents listed as well.250  The panel decided unanimously in favour of the 
generic applicant, Apotex, stating that Astra-Zeneca was not entitled to list patents on 
drugs no longer available to the public.  The Justices agreed that section 4(5) of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations required particular patents to be 
linked to particular submissions.251  This linkage is unique to the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations and is highlighted in Astra-Zeneca.   
 The Bristol-Myers case was about the bioequivalence of the same raw ingredient 
sourced from two different species of plant – one used by Biolyse and the other used by 
Bristol-Myers, who marketed the product first.  In Bristol-Myers, the issue was whether 
or not Biolyse’s product should be considered a generic since it used the same active 
ingredient, paclitaxel, as Bristol-Myer’s product.  However, Bristol-Myer’s product had 
no patent over paclitaxel, since it is a natural compound contained within a flower.  The 
case was decided by determining that the scope of section 5(1.1) of the Patented 
                                                          
250 Recall from note 2 that the filing of subsequent patents on a drug product that has already been approved 
and marketed is called evergreening.  It is a strategy employed for the purposes of trying to extend the 
patent life of a product.  This practice has since been addressed in a new version of the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations, released in 2006.  The new regulations in Section 6 impose a “freeze” 
on the patent status once the new molecule has achieved a Notice of Compliance.   
251 Supra note 1, at s 4(5), Section 4(5) states that “Subject to subsection (6), a first person who submits a 
patent list must do so at the time the person files the new drug submission or the supplement to a new drug 
submission to which the patent list relates.”  Therefore, the new patents had to be incorporated into the 
product to receive protection under the Regulations. 
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Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations was for generic medicine applications 
only, and not innovative or unpatentable medicines: 
 5. (1) If a second person files a submission for a notice of compliance in respect  
 of a drug and the submission directly or indirectly compares the drug with, or 
 makes reference to, another drug marketed in Canada under a notice of  
 compliance issued to a first person and in respect of which a patent list has been 
 submitted, the second person shall, in the submission, with respect to each patent 
 on the register in respect of the other drug,  
 (a) state that the second person accepts that the notice of compliance will not 
 issue until the patent expires; or  
 (b) allege that  
  (i) the statement made by the first person under paragraph 4(4)(d)  is  
  false,  
  (ii) the patent has expired,  
  (iii) the patent is not valid, or  
  (iv) no claim for the medicinal ingredient, no claim for the formulation,  
  no claim for the dosage form and no claim for the use of the medicinal  
  ingredient. 
 
Since Biolyse did not rely on any of Bristol-Myer’s data, it was not considered a generic 
manufacturer applying to copy and produce a branded product.   Therefore, this case is 
primarily about the legal interpretation of a provision within the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations – there was never any contention over the issue of 
whether or not natural substances were patentable.252 The court also determined that the 
appropriate standard of review for determining the scope of section 5(1.1) is correctness, 
since it is a purely legal issue.  The dissent was in agreement with the majority on the 
issue of the standard of review.    
 A common issue across several industries is the interpretation of section 27(3) of 
the Patent Act, which involves sufficiency of disclosure, and the issue also arises when a 
pharmaceutical patent holder has not disclosed a patent well enough to allow the generic 
                                                          
252 If so, this case would involve issues in both the Regulations and the Patent Act.    
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manufacturer to re-create the invention.  In Pfizer Canada Inc. v Novopharm Limited,253 
Pfizer was seeking an Order of Prohibition through Section 6(1) of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations to block Teva from getting a Notice of 
Compliance to create a copy of its erectile dysfunction drug, Viagra (sildenafil).  From 
this application, Kelen J. evaluated obviousness, utility, and disclosure of Pfizer’s 
patents, even though he could not make a ruling of invalidity on the patents, and held that 
there was sufficient disclosure by the patent holder.  Blais, C.J., Nadon J.A., and Trudel 
J.A. reviewed the Federal Court decision and upheld it.254  The issue of sufficiency of 
disclosure at the Supreme Court referenced jurisprudence on sufficiency of disclosure in 
Section 27(3), including Consolboard, which concludes that sufficiency of disclosure is 
met when the invention is adequately described in the claims, as well as what the 
invention does.255  Besides Consolboard, Appendix Two lists several patent cases where 
sufficiency of disclosure has been an issue, including Burton Parsons, Monsanto ‘79, 
Gilcross, and Farbwerke.  The ruling on sufficiency of disclosure in this case established 
Teva’s allegations under Section Five of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations.256 
 The Sanofi-Synthelabo case originated when Sanofi-Synthelabo applied for an 
Order of Prohibition under Section Six of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations to block the manufacture and sale of a generic copy of its blockbuster 
anticoagulant drug, Plavix.257  Apotex challenged the validity of Sanofi-Synthelabo’s 
                                                          
253 Pfizer Canada Inc. v Novopharm Limited and the Minister of Health [2009] FC 638.   
254 [2010] FCA, 242.   
255 [2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60.     
256 Specifically, it established its allegations under Section 5(3) and Subsection 5(1)(b)(iii).    
257 Sanofi-Synthelabo v Apotex Inc. [2005] FC 390.  Anticoagulant drugs reduce the ability of the blood to 
coagulate or “clot,” which can reduce the risks of subsequent heart attack, stroke, and embolism when 
certain medical conditions arise.  The generic name of Plavix is clopidogrel.   
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patents on Plavix, since the chemical, when synthesized, was a mirror image of another 
molecule that Sanofi-Synthelabo had intentionally tried to develop (the genus patent).  
Since Sanofi had patented the intentioned molecule, Apotex claimed that the 
unintentioned “mirror-image” of that molecule, Plavix, was not patentable for two 
reasons: it was prior art, and it could be anticipated from the genus patent.  The court 
upheld the patent on the “accidental” molecule, since a person skilled in the art of drug 
development would not have anticipated how to isolate the new substance, nor anticipate 
what it would be used for.  The Federal Court of Appeal reviewed and upheld the 
decision258 before it reached the Supreme Court and was subsequently dismissed.  The 
issue of genus and species patents has been addressed by other Supreme Court cases, and 
so has the issue of anticipation.  Therefore, the issues in Sanofi-Synthelabo are not unique 
to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  The Supreme Court dealt 
with the genus/species patent issue in C.H. Boehringer Sohn v Bell-Craig Limited,259 
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v Gilbert and Company,260 and Monsanto Company v 
Commissioner of Patents.261    
 The Sanofi-Aventis case was a question of Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations section eight damages.  Section eight is a compensation 
mechanism for generic manufacturers to receive payments if an innovator’s Order of 
Prohibition is discontinued or dismissed by the court.  The case addressed the issue of the 
point when damages are deemed to begin, called the “hypothetical start date,” as well as 
the market share the generic company would have had if the generic approval had not 
                                                          
258 Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo [2006] FCA 421. 
259 [1963] SCR 410. 
260 [1996] SCR 189.   
261 [1979] 2 SCR 1108.   
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been delayed by the opposition of the innovator. 262  The case was dismissed, with no 
reasons provided, suggesting agreement with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal.  
 In summary, four of the cases, Merck-Frosst, Astra-Zeneca, Bristol-Myers, and 
Sanofi-Aventis primarily involve the Regulations themselves, while two of the cases, 
Sanofi-Synthelabo and Teva, primarily involve patent disputes that were adjudicated 
through the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  It is therefore not 
surprising that the pattern of decision making in these cases would be similar to the 
overall pattern of decision making in the patent cases.263   
  
                                                          
262 [1982] 1 SCR 907. 
263 That similarity was demonstrated in Table Two on page 42.   
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Table 4: Primary Issues in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases 
 
Case Issue Primarily PM(NOC) 
or Patent?  
Merck-Frosst Canada 
Inc. v Canada 
(Minister of National 
Health and Welfare)264   
Filing procedure for a 
Notice of Allegation; 
sublicencing under a 
compulsory licencing 
regime 
PM(NOC) Regulations 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v 
Canada (Attorney 
General)265  
Bioequivalence; 
Interpretation of S.5(1.1) is 
a legal issue, so standard of 
review is correctness  
PM(NOC) Regulations 
AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v Canada 
(Minister of Health)266 
Listing of new patents for a 
drug that the innovator 
company withdrew from 
the market (Losec) 
PM(NOC) Regulations 
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-
Synthelabo Canada 
Inc.267  
Novelty and obviousness: 
mirror image of intended 
molecule is patentable 
Patent Act 
Teva Canada Ltd v 
Pfizer Canada Inc.268 
Sufficiency of disclosure of 
patent; obviousness; utility 
Patent Act 
Sanofi-Aventis v 
Apotex Inc.269 
Damages 
PM(NOC) Regulations  
 
  
                                                          
264 [1998] 2 SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-Frosst].   
265 [2005] 1 SCR 533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-Myers].   
266 [2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 [Astra-Zeneca]. 
267 [2008] 3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-Synthelabo]. 
268 [2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60 [Teva].   
269 [2015] SCC 20 [Sanofi-Aventis].    
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Unanimous Decisions 
 Unanimous Decision 
Majority 
with 
Dissent 
 The Composition of the Court 
 Figure Two describes the composition of the court in deciding Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.   
Figure 2: The Composition of the Court in Deciding Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lamer was the Chief Justice for one of the six cases, Merck-Frosst, but did not sit on that 
case.  McLachlin has been the chief justice for the other five, and has sat on four of those 
five cases.  It is unclear if this high level of consistency of the Chief Justice has 
contributed to the high level of unanimity in the case, but could be a subject of future 
study.   
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 Three of the decisions were panels of seven, and three were panels of nine.  Of the 
three panels of nine, one decision, Bristol-Myers, was an issue of the scope of section 
5(1.1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  Another, Astra-
Zeneca, was about listing patents for a drug that had been removed from the Canadian 
market, and involved the proper interpretation of section 4(5).  The third, Sanofi-Aventis, 
was a dismissed appeal on section eight damages, with no reasons given, just agreement 
with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal.  Interestingly, Teva and Sanofi-
Synthelabo, both cases primarily about the validity of the patents for the purposes of 
approving a generic, were panels of seven, which suggests that the Supreme Court does 
not see the cases as of primary importance among all of the cases that it hears.     
 There is a high degree of consistency in the composition of the panels, since all 
six cases have been heard within a seventeen-year period.  Excepting Merck ’98, the 
remaining cases span only ten years.  McLachlin C.J., Abella J., Deschamps J., and Lebel 
J. have sat on the most cases, each sitting on four.  Of these four justices, Abella J., 
Deschamps, J., and Lebel J. all participated in the same three cases, and voted together in 
all.   
 It was not until Sanofi-Aventis was there a significant change in the Justices 
participating in the cases.  Sanofi-Aventis saw the addition of Justices Gascon, Côté, and 
Wagner, with the retirement of Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and Sopinka.  The 
three new Justices participated with the others in a unanimous decision to dismiss the 
case.   
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 Binnie J. has written two of the five majority judgments, while Lebel J., Rothstein 
J., and Iacobucci J. have each written one judgment for the majority.270  The one 
dissenting judgment was written by Bastarache J., with Major J. and Iacobucci J. 
agreeing with the dissent.  McLachlin J. has been a Supreme Court Justice during all six 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, and has participated in four, but has 
never written the majority judgment.  Therefore, the Justices have not deferred the 
judgment to one “expert” Justice in this field, which may have been the case if the 
decisions were too technical to adjudicate.   
 Copyright Data 
 The Wilkinson study in “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” 
included the five pentalogy cases released in the summer of 2012, plus the six most 
recent cases prior to them.  All of the cases dealt with the same (older) version of the 
Copyright Act.271  One additional non-copyright case with relevant links to copyright 
decisions was included.272     
 Appendix Five highlights the issues and the decisions in the eleven copyright 
cases.  This decision making pattern data is summarized in Table Four, and is compared 
to the patent cases and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.   
  
                                                          
270 As mentioned, Sanofi-Aventis was written without reasons, upholding the Federal Court of Appeal 
decision and referring to its reasons.   
271 Copyright Act RSC 1985.   
272 Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 <http://scc.lexum.org/decisiascc-csc/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/7963/index.do> [Crookes]. 
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Table 5: Decision Making Patterns in the Copyright Cases, PM(NOC) Cases, and the 
Patent Cases: Instances of Judgments273 
 
 Copyright 
Pentalogy Cases 
PM(NOC) Cases Patent Cases  
1970 - 2012274 
Unanimous 3/11 (27%) 5/6 (83%) 18/24 (75%) 
Majority with concurring 
reasons but no minority 
dissent 
3/11 (27%) 0% 1/24 (4.2%) 
Majority with or without 
concurring reasons and at 
least one dissent (any type) 
5/11 (45%) 1/6 (17%) 6/24 (25%) 
Majority with no concurring 
reasons and dissent 
4/11 (36%) 1/6 (17%) 5/24 (21%) 
Majority with Concurring 
Reasons and Dissent 
1/11 (9%) 0% 0% 
Multiple majority with 
Dissent 
2/11 (18%) 0% 0% 
Majority judgments with 
unanimous dissent 
5/11 (45%) 1/6 (17%) 5/24 (21%) 
Judgments with non-
unanimous dissent 
0% 0% 1/24 (4.2%) 
Judgments with solo dissents 0% 0% 1/24 (4.2%) 
Total number of Cases 11 6 24 
 
Overall, the pattern of decision making is much different in the copyright cases.  The 
level of unanimity is threefold higher in the patent cases as well as the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  The level of majority cases with dissent is more 
than twice as high in the copyright cases than the patent cases and the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, which characterizes the patent cases and the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as demonstrating a high level of 
unanimity, with little dissent.  The copyright cases are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, where most of the decisions are majority decisions accompanied by dissent.   
                                                          
273 The copyright data was extracted from Professor Wilkinson’s article, supra note 18, Figure 2, page 82.  
Additional data was taken from various places in Section B, “The Decisions,” pages 76 to 83.   
274 The patent cases data used exclude the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as discussed.   
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 Concurring reasons play little part in the patent decisions, and no part in the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) decisions.  The level of concurrence in the 
copyright cases is more significant, where twenty-seven percent of the copyright cases 
have a majority with concurring reasons but no minority dissent, and another nine percent 
of the cases have concurring reasons with dissent, for a total of thirty-six percent as 
concurring decisions.   
 The presence of a majority with concurring reasons and dissent is low among all 
categories, including copyright.  The presence of solo dissents across all of the cases is 
also low, with only one solo dissent written across all forty-one cases, which was a patent 
case, adjudicated through the Patent Act.   
 The three comparator groups were also examined by number and type of decision, 
with the results presented in Table Five.   
Table 6: Number of Reasons Given in each Group of Cases 
 
 Copyright 
Pentalogy275 
PM(NOC) Cases Patent Cases 
Majority (includes 
unanimous) 
13 (59%) 6 (86%) 25 (81%) 
Concurring 7 (29%) 0 1 (3%) 
Dissenting 5 (21%) 1 (17%) 7 (23%) 
Number of Cases 11 6 24 
Total number of 
reasons 
24 7 33 
Reasons/Case 2.2 1.2 1.4 
 
The case data are broken down in this fashion to confirm, reject, or provide support for 
any possible inferences from the overall judgment data by case, as in Table Four.  The 
higher percentage of majority reasons in the patent cases is strongly reflective of the 
                                                          
275 Supra note 18 at 82, Figure 2.  The values were derived from this Figure, as well as from various 
references in the text of the article.   
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higher level of unanimity in the patent cases and the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases.  The patent cases have many fewer cases with dissent judgments than 
copyright cases, but the overall percentage of dissenting reasons given for patent cases, 
approximates the copyright data.  Therefore, when dissent does exist in the patent cases, 
it indicates that there is a significant amount of disagreement among the Justices.   
 Overall, however, there is still one more reason (of any type) in an average 
copyright case than in an average Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case, and 
nearly the same ratio for the patent cases in comparison to the copyright cases.  Fewer 
reasons being written in the patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases 
may be related to the number of issues per case, since most of the patent and Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases in the study, on a general level, have one issue to 
be decided per case.276  Wilkinson did not comment on the number of issues per case in 
her article, but Wilkinson does state that the issues in the three copyright cases with 
unanimous dissents range from “more straightforward to extremely complex,”277 further 
differentiating them from the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  Fewer 
reasons overall also suggests that cases involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations do not create significant disagreement over their interpretation  
among the Justices.   
 Supreme Court Decision Making Data 
 Wilkinson’s article referenced several articles that dealt with decision making 
patterns at the Supreme Court of Canada.  Those articles were sourced and referenced 
                                                          
276 Recall that Monsanto ’04 had two distinct questions to be adjudicated.  Gilcross had multiple issues, but 
they arose under one central question for the Supreme Court to decide through the Patent Act.   
277 Supra note 18 at 83.   
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directly.  The decision making data on the Supreme Court was compiled from this data 
for comparison to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and the patent 
cases.   
 Research undertaken by Peter McCormick concluded that the rate of unanimity 
among Supreme Court decisions is approximately 63 percent.278  McCormick’s study 
period started at the beginning of 1970 and extended to the end of 2002, covering 3,326 
decisions in total.  However, the rate of unanimity across this period was highly variable, 
ranging from a low of 43.4 percent in 1995279 to a high of 90.2 percent in 1980.280  The 
peak in unanimity occurred in 1980, just prior to the signing of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 1982, and decreased steadily as Charter challenges at the Supreme Court 
grew in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Concurring decisions peaked in 1995, and have declined 
ever since, correlating highly with the ensuing decline in Charter cases.  Therefore, 
McCormick’s “average” rate of unanimity has been calculated across a large range of 
values.   
 The 2004 to 2014 statistics on the Supreme Court of Canada’s website present a 
more time-period relevant rate of unanimity for comparison,281, 282 where the average rate 
                                                          
278 Supra note 210 at 106.      
279 Ibid at 107.   
280 Ibid.  The incidence of non-unanimity was reached in 1980, at eleven cases.  The total number of 
judgments by the Supreme Court that year is found by visiting the historical judgments page on the 
Supreme Court of Canada website at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/nav_date.do  
281 Supreme Court of Canada Statistics, 2004, 2014.  Statistics on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
disposition rate are found on the Supreme Court of Canada website at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case -
dossier/stat/cat4-eng.aspx.  The time period is more relevant since the Supreme Court heard four of the six 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases between 2004 and 2014.   
282 Supreme Court cases arrive at the court from three sources.  If a party wishes to appeal the decision of 
another court, a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court can decide if leave to appeal will be granted to 
hear the case.  The criteria for hearing a case are based on the importance of the issue at hand to the public, 
or if the case raises an important issue of law.  Federal references require the Supreme Court to give an 
opinion on the questions referred to the Court by the Governor in Council, and are considered appeals as of 
right, as they are automatically approved to be heard.  Certain serious criminal cases are also appeals as of 
right and must be heard by the Court.  Of the 831 cases between 2004 and 2014, 170 (approximately twenty 
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of unanimity was 73 percent.  The period is more relevant, since Charter cases are not 
comprising as high of a proportion of the cases heard as in the period covered by 
McCormick.  The results are collated in Table Six, where the ratio of unanimous cases to 
the total caseload was totalled from the data, then compared to the copyright, patent, and 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) data.   
Table 7: Split/Unanimous Judgments: A Comparison to the Copyright Pentalogy and the 
Supreme Court of Canada Generally 
 
 Copyright283 PM(NOC) Patent Supreme 
Court 
Split 8 1 4 226 
Unanimous 3 5 21 600 
Total 11 6 25 826 
Split/Total 73% 17% 16% 27% 
Unanimous/Total 27% 83% 84% 73% 
 
The data show similar splits in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) and patent 
cases with the Supreme Court generally, but all three vary significantly from the 
copyright cases.  The data is supportive of the previous findings on the high level of 
unanimity in patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases earlier in this 
chapter.   
 During the period of 2004 to 2014, the Supreme Court heard four of the six 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, where three of the four cases were 
unanimous.  Over the time span of all of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
                                                          
percent) cases heard were appeals as of right.  Because twenty percent of the cases are appeals as of right, 
future research could involve revamping the data to remove the appeals as of right, to see if the pattern is 
different.  If a significant portion of the appeals as of right are questions of criminal law, they may be 
imparting more disagreement into the decision making pattern.  Comparing the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) cases to Supreme Court cases that were only granted leave to appeal may prove to represent 
a more valid comparison.   
283 Supra note 18 at 82.  The copyright data on split and unanimous decisions was calculated from Figure 
Two on page 82 of the Wilkinson article.       
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cases, 1998 to 2015, the average rate of unanimity climbed above both Supreme Court 
unanimity average calculations to 83 percent.  However, there are few Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, making the average highly sensitive to change - 
the addition of one more case would move that average by one-seventh, or fourteen 
percent.284  Caution should be used in drawing any comparisons of the rate of unanimity 
of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases to the general level of Supreme 
Court unanimity, other than to state that they both have similarly high rates of unanimity.  
To state that the rate of unanimity is higher in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases may be premature until several more cases have been heard.   
 Based on 1,716 Supreme Court judgments between 1984 and 2006, McCormick 
states that the general rate of concurring reasons written is 36 percent.285  This is much 
higher than having no concurring reasons among the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases and the three percent for the patent cases.  Having no concurring 
reasons in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is inconsistent with 
McCormick’s finding that “separate concurrences are a regular and ongoing aspect of the 
work [of the Supreme Court].”286 
 Case Disposition 
 The general Supreme Court disposition rate was calculated from the Supreme 
Court’s published statistics, for the period 2004 to 2014.287   The overall disposition rate 
                                                          
284 Since there are currently six cases, each case impacts the average by one-sixth.  If the case load grew to 
seven, each case would impact the average by one-seventh.   
285 Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 83, quoting Peter McCormick, which can be referenced in note 130 at Table 
1, page 144.  There were 906 signatures on the 610 concurring reasons, among the 1716 reasons given 
during this period.  The figure of 36 percent is achieved by dividing 610 by 1716 and converting to a 
percent.   
286 McCormick, supra note 34 at 163.   
287 See “ Supreme Court Statistics 2004 to 2014,” http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/stat/index-
eng.aspx 
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for the period was calculated to be 47 percent.  The disposition rate, for the purposes of 
this paper, is the proportion of appeal cases allowed by the Supreme Court, expressed as 
a percentage of the total number of that type of case.   
 Since four of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases were heard 
between 2005 and 2014, that reference data on case disposition is timely and relevant.  
However, the small number of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases makes 
the disposition data highly sensitive - a change in the disposition of one case would affect 
the result by one in seven, or fourteen percent.  However, comparing the overall 
disposition rate to the patent data together provides some insight, since thirty patent cases 
were in the study period.288  If the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases is very close to the Supreme Court patent cases, then examining the 
disposition rate may provide some guidance as to future disposition rates for the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.   
 Table Seven provides the disposition of the Supreme Court patent and Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  Table Eight summarizes the data in Table 
Seven and compares the disposition rate to Supreme Court cases between 2004 and 2014.   
  
                                                          
288 Recall that the two Monsanto decisions in one case from 2004 rendered two separate decisions.   
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Table 8: Supreme Court of Canada Disposition on Patent Cases and Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases: Appeal Allowed or Dismissed289 
 
Case Name Appeal Allowed 
or Dismissed 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v Ford Motor Co. of Canada Dismissed.    
Lacal Industries Ltd. v Slater Steel Industries Ltd. Dismissed.   
General Foods Ltd. v Struthers Scientific and International 
Corp. 
Allowed. 
Merck & Co. v S. & U. Chemicals Ltd.  Dismissed. 
Tennessee Eastman Co., a division of Eastman Kodak Co. v 
Canada 
Dismissed. 
Gilcross Ltd. v Sandoz Patents Ltd.   Allowed. Cross 
appeal dismissed.   
Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v Hewlett Packard (Canada) Ltd.   Allowed.   
Dairy Foods Inc. v Co-operative Agricole de Granby  Dismissed. 
Eli Lilly & Co. v S & U Chemicals Ltd. Dismissed. 
Farbwerke Hoechst AG Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v 
Halocarbon (Ontario) Ltd. 
Allowed. 
Monsanto Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1979) Allowed. 
Consolboard Inc. v MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd. Allowed. 
Eli Lilly & Co. v Novopharm Ltd; Eli Lilly & Co. v Apotex Inc.  Allowed.   
Armstrong Cork Canada v Domco Industries Ltd. Dismissed.   
Shell Oil Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) Allowed.   
Pioneer Hi Bred Ltd. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) Dismissed. 
Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v Apotex Inc.   Allowed.   
Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National 
Health and Welfare) (1998, PM(NOC)) 
Allowed 
Whirlpool Corp. v Camco Inc. Dismissed.   
Whirlpool Corp. v Maytag Inc. Dismissed.  
Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)  Allowed.   
Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd.  Dismissed.   
Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser (2004, first issue) Allowed (in part). 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser (2004, second issue) Dismissed (in 
part). 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (PM(NOC) Allowed. 
Astra Zeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (PM(NOC)) Allowed. 
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo (PM(NOC)) Dismissed. 
Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) Dismissed.  
Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. PM(NOC) Allowed.   
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc. (PM(NOC)) Dismissed 
  
                                                          
289 Refer to Appendix Two for full citations for the patent cases.  Cases in bold represent cases that arose to 
the Supreme Court after a Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) challenge.   
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Table 9: Summary of Patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case 
Dispositions 
 
 Patent Cases 
(with 
PM(NOC) 
Cases 
Patent Cases 
(without 
PM(NOC) 
cases 
PM(NOC) 
cases 
General 
Supreme 
Court290 
Total Cases291 30 24 6 822 
Allowed 13 11 4 386 
Dismissed 17 13 2 436 
Disposition Rate 
(Percent of 
allowed cases of 
total) 
43% 45% 67% 47% 
 
The patent cases have a similar rate of allowed appeals as the Supreme Court generally, 
but the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have a slightly higher rate.  
Because the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are highly sensitive to 
changes in data, where the addition of one more case would change the disposition rate 
by fourteen percent, it is difficult to conclude that these cases have a higher overall 
disposition rate than the patent cases, or the Supreme Court cases generally.  If that 
conclusion could be made, it could point to errors in interpretation of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations at the Federal Court or Federal Court of 
Appeal, in which case research could begin by identifying, categorizing, and studying the 
errors.   
 Solo Dissent 
 Joseph’s study shows that the percentage of solo dissents written for cases 
primarily about private law has steadily decreased from 55 percent in the Laskin court to 
                                                          
290 Supra note 287.   
291 Recall that Monsanto is counted as two cases, for a total of 30 cases.  Gilcross is counted as one case 
that was allowed.  Alternatively, it could be counted as one allowed appeal and one dismissed appeal but 
the overall result is not changed significantly.   
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ten percent in the McLachlin C.J. court.292  This suggests that the Supreme Court Justices 
are generally not at odds with each other with respect to cases involving private litigants.  
Seeing that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases involve the Attorney 
General as a litigant (representing Health Canada), but are essentially private disputes 
between pharmaceutical companies, the lack of solo dissents across all of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases seems consistent with the low incidence of 
dissent in private cases in the McLachlin C.J. court.    
 Joseph also found that the solo dissent rate, as a percentage of all of the Supreme 
Court cases in the study, was steadily increasing, to a maximum of 6.3 percent in the 
McLachlin C.J. court, differing from the four percent rate of solo dissent in the patent 
cases and its non-existence in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.293  
The solo dissent rates for Justices studied by Joseph who have sat on the Supreme Court 
since the first Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases in 1998 is set forth in 
Table Nine.294 The percentage of solo dissents across the study categories is in Table Ten.       
  
                                                          
292 Supra note 224 at 511, Table 7.  Under the McLachlin C.J. court, sixty percent of solo dissents are 
written for criminal cases, and thirty percent are written for public cases.   
293 Refer to Table Two on page 81.   
294 Adapted from a similar table created by Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 80.  The 
original data was extracted from Joseph, Supra note 182 at 511, Table 7.  Justices Abella, Charron, 
Cromwell, Rothstein, Karakatsanis, Gascon, and Moldaver are not included in Joseph’s data.   
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Table 10: Solo dissent rates for Justices sitting in 2002 or appointed by the end of 2003 
 
Justice (all sat on the 
Court for various 
PM(NOC) cases) 
Frequency of Solo 
Dissent Reported by 
Joseph (up to and 
including 2003) 
Number of 
PM(NOC) cases 
heard 
Dissent 
Major More than average 2 1 (not solo) 
Arbour More than average 0 N/A 
L’Heureux-Dubé More than average 1 No 
Bastarache More than average 3 1 (not solo) 
McLachlin Average 4 No 
LeBel Average 4 No 
Iacobucci Less than average 1 No 
Gonthier Less than average 1 No 
Deschamps Less than average 4 No 
Cory Less than average 1 No 
Binnie Never 3 No 
Fish Never 3 No 
 
Table 11: Percent of Solo Dissents of the Copyright, PM(NOC), and Patent Caseloads 
 
 Copyright Cases PM(NOC) Cases Patent Cases 
Solo Dissents 0 0 1 
Total Caseload 11 6 30 
Percentage of Solo 
Dissents 
0% 0% 3% 
 
There is a complete lack of solo dissents in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases; with the small number of cases, it would not be prudent to distinguish 
them from the Supreme Court data generally.  The lone case with any type of dissent was 
Bristol-Myers, an issue of statutory interpretation under section 5(1) of the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, where three dissenting judges felt that 
Biolyse should have been treated like a generic company applying to copy an innovative 
medicine.  If this was the case, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations would apply, and the Biolyse product would be treated as a generic 
medicine.  The majority, however, found that Biolyse was an innovator, and that the 
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Regulations did not apply to Biolyse’s product.  If section 5(1) was found to apply, the 
contentious issue of patenting natural substances would have also arisen, which would 
also involve the element of patentable subject matter, and not the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  With the level of dissent being so low, it is not 
surprising that the two Justices that have a higher frequency of solo dissent generally are 
the only ones that took part in the sole case with a dissent.    
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate the decision making pattern of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and compare it to the pattern in the 
Supreme Court patent cases, the Supreme Court copyright cases in Wilkinson’s study,  
and the pattern in general Supreme Court jurisprudence.   
 Comparing the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases to the Supreme 
Court Copyright Cases 
 With respect to the copyright cases, a similar pattern of decision making could 
indicate that the Justices were having similar issues with both types of cases.  Since their 
commonality is the fact that they were all cases that arose following a judicial review at 
the Federal Court, a similar decision making pattern could point to problems with the 
judicial review process for these types of cases, providing guidance for future research.  
Areas of concern with employing judicial review for the generic approval cases include 
the reversed burden of proof and the standard of review of reasonableness.  In addition, 
judicial review can only answer one question, and the process is therefore limited to 
answering whether or not Health Canada acted reasonably when it added patents to its 
Patent Register, so the process constrains the judge from determining the validity of the 
patents in question.  Other potential problems include proceeding summarily (which 
disallows the examination of live witnesses), and lacking an effective appeal process for 
the patent holder.  A dissimilar pattern between the two case groups suggests that the 
process of judicial review is not problematic, as asserted by the European Union Member 
States in their complaint.   
   The decision making pattern in the copyright cases is significantly different from 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  The rate of unanimous decisions 
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is 27 percent, compared to 83 percent in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases, and the rate of concurrence is 36 percent, compared to zero percent in the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  With a three-fold higher rate of unanimity, 
combined with no concurring opinions (with and without dissent), there appears to be 
much less divided opinion on matters related to the regulatory approval of generic drugs 
in Canada than to copyright.   
 The copyright cases also exhibit a rate of dissent that is almost double that of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  If Wilkinson’s conclusion is correct, 
that copyright law is “in a dynamic period of flux and change,”295 “‘big’ questions are 
coming before the Court,”296 and “policy-divergent responses would appear to need to be 
generated to prepare the field within which these can be managed,”297 then the 
regulations linking patent and approval of generic pharmaceuticals are not.  This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases generate an average of 1.2 written reasons per case, while the copyright cases 
generate 2.2 reasons per case.   
 A comparison of decision making patterns in Supreme Court Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases with Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright cases does not 
support the conclusion that the two sets of cases are adjudicated with a similar underlying 
problem that could be related to judicial review in the lower courts.  The primary cases in 
both sets were adjudicated by judicial review, but the study does not corroborate the view 
that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are problematic because of 
                                                          
295 Wilkinson, supra note 18 at 84, citing McCormick, supra note 206 at 166.    
296 Ibid.   
297 Ibid.     
108 
 
 
judicial review.  This is supported by a qualitative analysis of the six Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases, of which four dealt with cases specific to those 
regulations.  And, of those four, none pointed to issues with the process of judicial 
review itself, or suggested that judicial review was causing a problem.  The other two 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases dealt specifically with patent issues, 
where one appeal was allowed and the other was dismissed.  A subsequent study of 
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal cases would provide additional evidence on 
the issue of judicial review, but comparative data on decision making patterns at the level 
of the Federal Court does not exist in the literature.  A general database of decision 
making would have to be built before any comparisons could be made.  Qualitative 
studies on subsets of these cases would be a mode of analysis that may be more realistic.   
 Comparing Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case Data to Supreme 
Court Patent Case Data 
 To complement this comparative analysis, the decision making pattern in the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases was also compared to the Supreme 
Court patent cases from 1970 to 2014.  In the event that the pattern was not found to be 
similar to that of the copyright cases, the pattern may be similar the patent subset of 
Supreme Court cases.   
 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case decision making pattern is 
almost identical to the patent case pattern, so this comparison provides no evidence of 
excessive disagreement in adjudicating the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases, and it does suggest that the cases are adjudicated similarly to the patent cases, 
despite the difference in the adjudication process.  Two of the six Patented Medicines 
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(Notice of Compliance) cases directly involved issues requiring interpretation of the 
Patent Act, which supports this conclusion.   
 Eighty-three percent (five out of six) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases were decided unanimously, only slightly higher than the 75 percent 
rate found in the Supreme Court patent cases generally.  In addition, the number of 
majority judgments with concurring reasons was very low in both – four percent in the 
patent cases, and zero in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  There 
were similar low levels of unanimous dissent in both, at 17 percent (one out of six cases) 
for the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and 21 percent (five out of 
twenty-four) for the patent cases.  The patent cases had five out of thirty cases (17 
percent) with unanimous dissent, while the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases had one out of six (17 percent).  The similar pattern of decision making is not 
surprising, given that two of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases 
dealt with issues requiring interpretation of the Patent Act,298 and the other four deal with 
the interpretation of a piece of legislation that is essentially outlines a procedure for 
getting generic approval.     
 Comparing Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case Data to Supreme 
Court Data  
 Both the Supreme Court cases overall, and the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases have a high rate of unanimous decision making, with the Supreme 
Court at 73 percent and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at 83 
percent.  Applying Songer and Siripurapu’s conclusions, this suggests that there would be 
                                                          
298 Teva and Sanofi-Synthelabo.   
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fewer issues per Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case than the Supreme Court 
generally.  Given that one or two issues per case were identified, this seems plausible 
when considering the breadth of cases that the Supreme Court hears.  In contrast to the 
low rates of unanimity in the Charter of Rights and Freedom cases from the mid-eighties 
to the mid-nineties, the high rate of unanimity in Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) cases signals little flux or uncertainty with respect to the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.  This is supported by a much lower level 
of concurrence as well.   
  Dissent – Comparing Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases 
 The lone Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case with a dissent was 
Bristol-Myers.  The dissent was written by Bastarache J., with Major J. in agreement.  
According to Joseph, both Major J. and Bastarache J. write solo dissenting opinions at a 
higher than average rate than their colleagues.  Given the small number of cases, it is not 
surprising that there are no solo dissents, but the presence of some dissent, unanimous 
dissent in this case, written by higher-than-average dissenters (across all of the cases they 
judged), suggests that the rate of general dissent is similar to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence overall.  With an overall low rate of dissent, it is difficult to conclude that 
the Justices have significant disagreement when adjudicating the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases, regardless of how the process was adjudicated in the lower 
court. 
 The Composition of the Court in the Cases 
 There has been a high degree of consistency in the composition of the court in 
deciding the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.  The same four Justices 
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have sat on four of the six cases.  Of the four, three have sat on the same three cases and 
voted together on all.  Binnie J. wrote two of the judgments, while the remaining four 
were written by different Justices, indicating that the issues in the cases can be managed 
by most Justices, not necessarily requiring a scientific background.  The implications of 
the consistency of the court on the decision making pattern itself will be borne out as 
more cases are heard at the Supreme Court – there are presently too few cases to make 
any conclusions about the effect of the composition of the court.   
 Disposition Rates 
 Overall, four cases were overturned at the Supreme Court, while two were 
dismissed.  Of the four allowed, two were about patent issues (Merck ’98 and Teva), and 
two were primarily about Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations issues 
(Bristol-Myers and Astra-Zeneca).  Of the dismissed cases, one was primarily about 
patent (Sanofi-Synthelabo) and one was about the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations (Sanofi-Aventis).   The disposition rate for the Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is higher than the disposition rate for the 
Supreme Court overall.  With this small data set, it is difficult to conclude that the 
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have difficulty with the interpretation or 
application of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations because of the 
judicial review process, but it does provide direction for future study into the issue.  A 
suitable investigation into the cases where appeals were allowed may reveal a common 
element, and whether or not it is related to the process of judicial review.  The high 
overturn rate also suggests that the Federal Court of Appeal’s treatment of the Federal 
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Court’s decisions in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases requires 
investigation.   
 Private Law and the Supreme Court 
 The small number of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases overall is 
indicative that there are few significant problems of national concern with the 
adjudication of these cases, since only six cases have risen to the Supreme Court since the 
Regulations came into effect in 1993.  Since the cases are primarily private economic law 
cases, it could be postulated that the Supreme Court justices choose not to hear the cases, 
and give little weight to these private matters when they do hear them.  However, the 
current study does indicate that the Supreme Court Justices do not treat all private 
economic law cases the same.  The different decision making pattern between the 
copyright cases, which are also private economic law, and the Patented Medicines 
(Notice of Compliance) cases indicates that the different realms of law are treated 
accordingly, and private economic law is not “blanketed” with any judicial policy.  Three 
of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have been decided by a panel 
of nine, and all three of those cases required interpreting the Patented Medicines (Notice 
of Compliance) Regulations, suggesting that the Supreme Court may view issues in the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as important to Canadians as other 
types of unrelated cases.   
 Although both sets of cases are considered matters of private law, both have 
aspects that are relevant to all Canadians, and an examination into those aspects may 
reveal additional information about the decision making results.   
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 Is Judicial Review Contributing to Injustice in the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Cases? 
 The analysis does not provide support for the assertion that the judicial review 
component of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations provides an 
avenue for creating disagreement that could lead to the incorrect adjudication in generic 
drug approval cases.  Even though the process is short of a full trial, the study does not 
indicate that the Justices cannot incorporate aspects of health law, administration law, and 
patent law to properly adjudicate the cases at the federal level.  This is also supported by 
the decision making pattern in the cases, which is nearly identical with the pattern for 
Supreme Court patent cases adjudicated since 1970.   
 If the high degree of unanimity in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases is indicative of what it stands for on its face – that high unanimity equates to less 
disagreement because of certainty in the interpretation, application, and issues before the 
law, then the results suggest that the Regulations present little difficulty for the justices in 
their current form.  This suggests that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases have, for the most part, a correct answer, or, at least, an answer that can be 
adjudicated without extreme difficulty.  The Justices exhibit a different pattern of 
decision making in the copyright cases, which are also private economic rights cases, 
which lends credence to the idea that the Justices are flexing their judicial muscle on a 
case-by-case basis, and not following a policy of overtly choosing unanimity.   
 Because the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations involve 
three aspects of law – administrative, health, and patent law - any adaptation of the 
Regulations requires examining which of these aspects is problematic before meaningful 
changes can be made to the Regulations.  This study indicates that the judicial review 
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process is not problematic, and therefore does not suggest that there are any issues 
associated with a process that only answers one question, nor the fact that it proceeds 
summarily.  Neither does it elucidate any issues with the burden of proof, the standard of 
review, nor the appeal rights of the litigants.  Judicial review appears to be suitable for 
this process, especially when one considers the fact that the assessment of any patents for 
the purpose of approving generics is performed in the context of the uses approved by 
Health Canada only.   
 Future Research 
  Further Study at the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal 
 Additional support for the conclusion that judicial review is not contributing to 
injustice in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases could be achieved by 
qualitatively examining the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the 
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, where the cases will involve significantly 
more mixed questions of law and fact.   
 A quantitative examination of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
cases at the Federal Court, similar to the examination of the decision making pattern of 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme Court could also be 
undertaken, but there are significantly more cases to study, and the actual number of 
cases is difficult to quantify.  As mentioned, Sanofi-Aventis, the inventor of the 
hypertension drug Altace (ramipril), filed three suits in Federal Court to block the 
genericization of the medicine by three separate manufacturers, even though they had 
already lost an initial challenge from generic medicine producer, Apotex.  An even bigger 
example, the litigation between Astra-Zeneca and Apotex over the blockbuster 
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gastroesophogeal reflux drug Losec (omeprazole) lasted seventeen years.299  Apotex filed 
twelve separate Notices of Allegation against various Losec patents, which resulted in 
fifty-five decisions by the Federal Court and fifteen decisions by the Federal Court of 
Appeal (and one at the Supreme Court, as discussed).300  Conservatively, if fifty 
medicines have lost patent status since the inception of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations in 1994, then there are potentially thousands of cases to 
examine.  An initial study to determine how many drugs have lost patent status since 
1994 is an initial step.   
  Data Exclusivity 
 Data exclusivity is another current issue that involves Division Eight of Canada’s 
Food Drug Regulations301 and section 5(5) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations.  Data exclusivity refers to the period of time where an 
innovator of a new pharmaceutical that has been issued a Notice of Compliance can 
protect their data from generic manufacturers who wish to copy the medicine.  Currently, 
data exclusivity is eight years from the date the Notice of Compliance was granted, but a 
generic manufacturer can apply for access to the data within six years from the date of the 
Notice of Compliance.  Canada rejected the European Union’s proposal to extend data 
protection by an additional two years302 in negotiations leading to the Canada-European 
                                                          
299 Supra note 105 at 12.   
300 Ibid.   
301 Supra note 56 at C.08.004.1.   
302 Supra note 110.  The European Union also negotiated successfully to extend patent term by the amount 
of time equal to the difference between the filing date for a Notice of Compliance and the date the Notice 
of Compliance is granted.  This extends patent life by over two years, and if the data exclusivity provisions 
were applied, the total time extension is estimated by Grootenorst and Hollis to be approximately five 
years.  
116 
 
 
Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement.303  With additional proposals by the 
European Union to extend the basic patent term, acceptance of all of the proposals could 
have added five and a half years of market monopoly.304  Extending data protection 
means that data exclusivity could have become another lever for extending patent term 
since it shortens the amount of time that a generic manufacturer has for developing the 
product which may mean that the generic version will not be ready by the time the 
relevant patents have expired.  In addition, drugs that have lost patent protection may 
benefit from the additional exclusivity period and prevent manufacturers from copying 
the product, even though they have no patent protection.  This push by the European 
Union did not consider the additional protection afforded to patent holders through the 
twenty-four month automatic stay in Section 6 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, and only serves to lengthen the period of brand exclusivity, 
making drug therapy more costly for Canadians.  Justification for Canada’s current 
protection of pharmaceutical patents through the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations needs to be elucidated and supported with data about the time 
required for generic drug development and approval to provide Canada with a defensible 
position for future international trade negotiations.  Extending data exclusivity 
                                                          
303 The text of the agreement was finalized on September 26, 2014 and is currently awaiting ratification.  
The finalized text can be found at www.international.gc.ca/CETA.   
304 Supra note 110.  Also see Paul Grootendorst and Aidan Hollis, “The 2011 Canada-European Union 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: an economic impact assessment of the EU’s proposed 
pharmaceutical intellectual property provisions,” (2011) 8(2), J Gen Meds, 81-103 at 93.  The European 
Union negotiated successfully to extend patent term by the amount of time equal to the difference between 
the filing date for a Notice of Compliance and the date the Notice of Compliance is granted (patent term 
restoration).  This extended patent life by over two years, and if the data exclusivity provisions were 
applied, the total time extension is estimated by Grootenorst and Hollis to be approximately five and a half 
years.   
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complicates patenting in Canada, as market exclusivity would become affected by two 
separate levers that really serve the same purpose.   
  Equal Rights of Appeal 
 Article 9 bis of the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement states that 
 If a Party relies on “patent linkage” mechanisms whereby the granting of   
 marketing authorisations (or notices of compliance or similar concepts) for  
 generic pharmaceutical products is linked to the existence of patent protection, it 
 shall ensure that all litigants are afforded equivalent and effective rights of 
 appeal.305   
However, there have been no adjustments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations regarding an appeal process to date.  Research needs to be 
undertaken to determine if current provisions, with the lack of an effective appeal for the 
patent holder, fulfill this provision.  Consideration needs to be given to the full process 
that is still available through the Patent Act, and provisions for damages that apply if the 
patents are later upheld.  An additional appeal functions as a patent extension, and 
changing the Regulations to allow for an appeal will have costly consequences for the 
court system, as well as for users of medicines in Canada.   
 Final Conclusions 
 Given the evidence in the pattern of decision making, it is difficult to conceive 
that there is any merit to amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations to encompass a complete action for infringement.  Suzanne Porter’s 
conclusion that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations need to be 
amended to convert a generic patent challenge to a full action for infringement is not 
                                                          
305 Supra note 303 at 9, 10.   
118 
 
 
supported by this study, in that there is no evidence that the process of judicial review at 
the Federal Court is causing more disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices than 
in the general Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The assertion by the European Union that 
innovative drugs are not given full protection under the Patent Act, because of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, is therefore not warranted, as 
the current process essentially adds an additional layer of patent protection, and the 
additional process is adjudicating the claims correctly.  An action for infringement is still 
available by the innovator under the Patent Act, even though the generic manufacturer is 
free to start manufacturing and selling the generic.  This is supports Canada’s position in 
the complaint filed by the European Union in 2000, as well as the conclusions in the 
Report of the Panel.306   
   
   
  
                                                          
306 Supra note 5 at p 116.     
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Appendix 1: NAFTA Article 1709 
 1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, each Party shall make patents available for any 
 inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
 that such inventions are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of   
 application.  For purposes of this Article, a Party may deem the terms "inventive 
 step" and "capable of  industrial application" to be synonymous with the terms 
 "non-obvious" and "useful," respectively.  
 2. A Party may exclude from patentability inventions if preventing in its territory 
 the commercial exploitation of the inventions is necessary to protect order public 
 or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid 
 serious prejudice to nature or the environment, provided that the exclusion is not 
 based solely on the ground that the Party prohibits commercial exploitation in its 
 territory of the subject matter of the patent.  
 3. A Party may also exclude from patentability:  
 (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
 animals;  
 (b) plants and animals other than microorganisms; and  
 (c) essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other 
 than non-biological and microbiological processes for such production.  
 Notwithstanding subparagraph (b), each Party shall provide for the protection of 
 plant varieties through patents, an effective scheme of sui generis protection, or 
 both.  
 4. If a Party has not made available product patent protection for pharmaceutical 
 or agricultural chemicals commensurate with paragraph 1:  
 (a) as of January 1, 1992, for subject matter that relates to naturally occurring 
 substances prepared or produced by, or significantly derived from, 
 microbiological processes and intended for food or medicine, and  
 (b) as of July 1, 1991, for any other subject matter,  
 that Party shall provide to the inventor of any such product or its assignee the 
 means to obtain product patent protection for such product for the unexpired term 
 of the patent for such product granted in another Party, as long as the product has 
 not been marketed in the Party providing protection under this paragraph and the 
 person seeking such protection makes a timely request.  
 5. Each Party shall provide that:  
 (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, the patent shall confer on the 
 patent  owner the right to prevent other persons from making, using or selling the 
 subject matter of the patent, without the patent owner's consent; and  
 (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, the patent shall confer on the 
 patent  owner the right to prevent other persons from using that process and from 
 using, selling, or importing at least the product obtained directly by that process, 
 without the patent owner's consent.  
 6. A Party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
 patent,  provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
 exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
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 interests of the patent owner,  taking into account the legitimate interests of other 
 persons.  
 7. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available and patent rights 
 enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, the territory of the 
 Party where the invention was made and whether products are imported or locally 
 produced.  
 8. A Party may revoke a patent only when:  
 (a) grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent; or  
 (b) the grant of a compulsory license has not remedied the lack of exploitation of 
 the patent.  
 9. Each Party shall permit patent owners to assign and transfer by succession their 
 patents, and to conclude licensing contracts.  
 10. Where the law of a Party allows for use of the subject matter of a patent, other 
 than that use allowed under paragraph 6, without the authorization of the right 
 holder, including use by the government or other persons authorized by the 
 government, the Party shall respect the following provisions:  
 (a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;  
 (b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
 made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
 commercial terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within 
 a reasonable period of time.  The requirement to make such efforts may be waived 
 by a Party in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
 urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national 
 emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the  public  non-
 commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent 
 search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will 
 be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly;  
 (c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it 
 was authorized;  
 (d) such use shall be non-exclusive;  
 (e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or 
 goodwill that enjoys such use;  
 (f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the Party's 
 domestic market;  
 (g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the 
 legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the 
 circumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent 
 authority shall have the authority to review, on motivated request, the continued 
 existence of these circumstances;  
 (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of 
 each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;  
 (i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization shall be subject 
 to judicial or other independent review by a distinct higher authority;  
 (j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall 
 be subject to judicial or other independent review by a distinct higher authority;  
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 (k) the Party shall not be obliged to apply the conditions set out in subparagraphs 
 (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after 
 judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive. The need to correct 
 anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of 
 remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to 
 refuse termination of authorization if and when the conditions that led to such 
 authorization are likely to recur;  
 (l) the Party shall not authorize the use of the subject matter of a patent to permit 
 the exploitation of another patent except as a remedy for an adjudicated violation 
 of domestic laws regarding anticompetitive practices.  
 11. Where the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, each 
 Party shall, in any infringement proceeding, place on the defendant the burden 
 of establishing that the allegedly infringing product was made by a process other  
  the patented process in one of the following situations:  
 (a) the product obtained by the patented process is new; or  
 (b) a substantial likelihood exists that the allegedly infringing product was made 
 by the  process and the patent owner has been unable through reasonable efforts 
 to determine the process actually used.  
 In the gathering and evaluation of evidence, the legitimate interests of the 
 defendant in protecting its trade secrets shall be taken into account.  
 12. Each Party shall provide a term of protection for patents of at least 20 years 
 from the date of filing or 17 years from the date of grant. A Party may extend the 
 term of patent  protection, in appropriate cases, to compensate for delays caused 
 by regulatory approval processes.307  
  
                                                          
307Supra note 3, Ch 17, Art 1709.    
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Appendix 2: Patent Cases by Panel Size, Issue, Industry, and Primary Statute Involved 
 
 Panel Size Case Type Industry 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v 
Ford Motor Co. of Canada, [1970] 
SCR 833, 1970 SCJ 40 [Libbey]. 
5 Patentable 
subject 
matter 
Auto (patent for 
curving glass on 
windshields) 
Lacal Industries Ltd. v Slater Steel 
Industries Ltd., [1972] SCR 29, 
1971 SCJ 86 [Lacal]. 
5 Patentable 
subject 
matter – 
prior art 
Steel 
General Foods, Ltd. v Struthers 
Scientific and International Corp., 
[1974] SCR 98, 1971 SCJ 142 
[General Foods]. 
7 Jurisdiction 
to hear 
patent 
matters 
Food 
Merck & Co. v S. & U. Chemicals 
Ltd., [1974] SCR 839, 1972 SCJ 
129 [Merck ‘74].  
5 Royalty 
rates on 
compulsory 
licencing 
products 
Pharmaceutical 
Tennessee Eastman Co., a division 
of Eastman Kodak Co. v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [1974] 
SCR 111 [Tennessee]. 
5 Patentable 
subject 
matter – 
methods not 
patentable 
Medical 
Gilcross Ltd. v Sandoz Patents 
Ltd., [1974] SCR 1336, 1972 SCJ 
144 [Gilcross].   
5 Inventive 
step 
Pharmaceutical 
Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v 
Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd., 
[1976] 1 SCR 555, 1974 SCJ 154 
[Burton]. 
9 (all present)  
Inventive 
step (non-
obviousness
) 
Chemical/phar
maceutical 
Dairy Foods Inc. v Co-operative 
Agricole de Granby, [1976] 2 SCR 
651, 1975 SCJ 95 [Dairy Foods].  
9 (5 majority, 3 
dissenting, 
Ritchie: solo 
dissent) 
Inventive 
step 
Chemical 
process where 
end product is 
food or drug 
Eli Lilly and Co. v S & U 
Chemicals Ltd, [1977] 1 SCR 536, 
1976 SCJ 36 [Lilly ‘77]. 
9 (Laskin 
Dickson, de 
Grandpre 
dissenting) 
Compulsory 
licencing 
Pharmaceuticals 
Farbwerke Hoechst AG Vormals 
Meister Lucius & Bruning v 
Halocarbon (Ontario) Ltd., [1979] 
2 SCR 929, 1979 SCJ 78 
[Farbwerke]. 
7(Martland, 
Estey, Dickson 
dissenting) 
1)Inventive 
step 
2)Nonobvio
usness 
Pharmaceuticals 
(anesthetics) 
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Monsanto Co. v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [1979] 
2 SCR. 1108, [1979] SCJ No. 89 
[Monsanto ‘79].   
9 (Martland and 
Dickson 
dissenting) 
Claims too 
broad for 
patenting 
Chemical 
Engineering 
Consolboard Inc. v.MacMillan 
Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd., 
[1981] 1 SCR 504, 1981 SCJ No. 
44 [Consolboard].   
5  Forest Products 
Eli Lilly & Co. v Novopharm Ltd.; 
Eli Lilly & Co. v Apotex Inc., 
[1998] 2 SCR 129, [1998] SCJ No. 
59 [Lilly ‘98]. 
7 Sublicensin
g under a 
compulsory 
licence 
Pharmaceutical  
Armstrong Cork Canada v Domco 
Industries Ltd., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 
907 [Armstrong].   
5 Damages 
assigned to 
a Patentee 
S.57 Patent 
Act 
Building 
Materials 
Shell Oil Co. v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [1982] 
2 SCR 536, 1982 SCJ 82 [Shell].   
5(Estey, 
Martland, 
Chouinard, 
Lamer 
dissenting) 
Inventive 
step  
Chemical 
Engineering 
Pioneer Hi Bred Ltd. v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 1623 [1989] S.C.J. No. 72 
[Pioneer].   
7 (Beetz and le 
Dain took no 
part in the 
decision); 
Sopinka and 
Wilson sat out 
Patentable 
Subject 
Matter (S.2) 
Life sciences 
(seeds) 
Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v Apotex 
Inc., [1992] 3 SCR 120, [1992] 
SCJ 83 [Ciba].   
5 (Stevenson J 
took no part in 
the decision); 
Corey, Sopinka, 
Major, 
McLachlin out 
Passing off 
(generic 
tablet takes 
on same 
shape and 
colour of 
brand 
name) 
Pharmaceutical 
Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v 
Canada (Minister of National 
Health and Welfare), [1998] 2 
SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-
Frosst].    
7 Filing of 
Notice of 
Allegation; 
sublicencin
g under a 
compulsory 
licencing 
regime 
(PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
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Whirlpool Corp. v Camco Inc., 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 68 [Whirlpool Camco].  
7 Overlapping 
claims; 
obviousness 
Industrial(mech
anical) 
Whirlpool Corp. v Maytag Inc., 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1116, [2000] 
S.C.J. No. 68 [Whirlpool Maytag].   
7 Overlapping 
claims; 
obviousness 
Industrial(mech
anical) 
Harvard College v Canada 
(Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 
4 SCR 45, 2002 SCC 76 
[Harvard].   
All 9 present Patentable 
Subject 
Matter (not 
PM(NOC)) 
Life sciences 
(higher and 
lower life 
forms) 
Apotex Inc. v Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
153, [2002] S.C.J. No. 78 
[Apotex].   
 
All 9 present Standard of 
review of 
mixed law 
and fact; 
utility (new 
use of an 
old 
compound); 
utility/inven
torship (not 
PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v 
Schmeiser, [2004] 1 SCR 902, 
2004 SCC 34 [Monsanto ‘04]. 
9 Use of a 
patented 
invention 
(not 
PM(NOC)) 
Agriculture 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada 
(Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 
533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-
Myers]. 
All 9 present Bioequivale
nce; 
standard of 
review: 
Correctness 
(PM(NOC))
; brand vs 
brand 
Pharmaceutical 
Astra Zeneca Canada Inc. v 
Canada (Minister of Health), 
[2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 
[Astra Zeneca].   
9 Listing of 
new patents 
for a drug 
that the 
innovator 
company 
withdrew 
from the 
market 
(Losec) 
(PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
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Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Canada Inc., 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 
3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-
Synthelabo]. 
7 Novelty and 
obviousness 
(PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2011] 1 SCR 3, 2011 
SCJ 1 [Celgene].   
7 Importing Pharmaceutical  
Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada 
Inc., [2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 
60 [Teva]. 
9 Sufficiency 
of 
disclosure 
of patent 
(PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc., 
[2015], 2015 SCC 20 [Sanofi-
Aventis].   
9 Damages 
(PM(NOC)) 
Pharmaceutical 
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Appendix 3: The Decision Making Data for all Supreme Court Patent and Patented 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases since 1970
308,309,310 
 
Case Issue Decision 
Majority 
Number of 
Signatures 
Concurrin
g Decision 
Number of 
Concurrin
g Reasons 
Concurrin
g Number 
of 
Signatures 
Number 
of 
Dissents 
Number of 
Dissent 
Signatures 
Harvard 
College v 
Canada [2002] 
4 SCR 45 
Patenting life 
Majority 
with dissent 
5 0 0 
0 
 
1 
 
4 
Astra Zeneca v 
Canada [2006] 
2 SCR 560 
Listing new 
patents on a 
drug 
withdrawn 
from the 
market 
Unanimous 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v 
Canada 
(Attorney 
General), 
[2005] 1 SCR 
533 
Bioequivalenc
e; standard of 
review in 
PM(NOC) 
cases 
Majority 
with dissent 
6 0 0 0 1 3 
Burton 
Parsons 
Chemicals Inc. 
v Hewlett-
Packard 
(Canada) Ltd., 
[1976] 1 SCR 
555 
Inventive step 
(non-
obviousness) 
Unanimous 9 0   0 0 0 0   
Celgene Corp 
v Canada 
(Attorney 
General), 
[2011] 1 SCR 
3 
U.S. 
manufactured 
product sent 
directly to 
Canada 
Unanimous 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Ciba-Geigy 
Canada Ltd. v 
Apotex Inc., 
[1992] SCJ 83 
Passing off 
(generic looks 
identical to 
brand) 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Dairy Foods 
Inc. v Co-
operative 
Agricole de 
Granby, 
[1976] 2 SCR 
651, 
Inventive step 
(chemical 
process where 
end product is 
food or drug) 
Majority 
with two 
dissents (one 
is solo) 
5 0 0 0 2 4 (3 +1) 
 Eli Lilly and 
Co. v S & U 
Chemicals Ltd, 
[1977] 1 SCR 
536 
Compulsory 
licensing 
(safety) 
Majority 
with 
concurring 
decision 
6 1 1 3 0 0 
                                                          
308 MCormick, Blocs, Swarms, p.111.   
309 Since 1993 for Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, since the legislation was introduced in 
1993.   
310 Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are denoted in red.   
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Farbwerke 
Hoechst AG 
Vormals 
Meister Lucius 
& Bruning v 
Halocarbon 
(Ontario) Ltd., 
[1979] 2 SCR 
929, 
Inventive step; 
non-
obviousness 
Majority 
with dissent 
6 0 0 0 1 3 
Monsanto Co. 
v. Canada 
(Commissioner 
of Patents), 
[1979] 2 
S.C.R. 1108, 
[1979] S.C.J. 
No. 89 
Claims too 
broad cannot 
be used for 
patenting 
Majority 
with dissent 
7 0 0 0 1 
2 (no 
reasons 
given) 
Consolboard 
Inc. v. 
MacMillan 
Bloedel 
(Saskatchewan
) Ltd., [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 504, 
1981 S.C.J. 
No. 44. 
In the 
specification, 
the inventor 
must specify 
how he 
invented his 
invention but 
not necessarily 
the end use of 
the invention 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
General 
Foods, Ltd. v 
Struthers 
Scientific and 
International 
Corp., [1974] 
SCR 98 
Jurisdiction to 
hear patent 
matters 
Unanimous 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Gilcross Ltd. v 
Sandoz Patents 
Ltd., [1974] 
SCR 1336 
Inventive step 
not required to 
be shown for 
each sub-
product of the 
main product if 
it is the same 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Lacal 
Industries Ltd. 
v Slater Steel 
Industries Ltd., 
[1972] SCR 29 
Patentable 
subject matter 
– an 
economical 
way of doing 
what is already 
known is not 
patentable 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Libbey-Owens-
Ford Glass 
Co. v Ford 
Motor Co. of 
Canada, 
[1970] SCR 
833 
Patentable 
subject matter 
always 
includes the 
use of the 
subject matter 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Merck & Co. v 
S. & U. 
Chemicals 
Ltd., [1974] 
SCR 839, 
Assigning 
royalty rates 
under 
compulsory 
licensing 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
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[1972] SCJ 
129.   
Merck-Frosst 
Canada Inc. v 
Canada 
(Minister of 
National 
Health and 
Welfare), 
[1998] 2 SCR 
193 
Purchasing 
raw ingredient 
from another 
company with 
a Notice of 
Compliance is 
not 
infringement 
Unanimous 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Novopharm 
Ltd.; Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. 
Apotex Inc., 
[1998] 2 
S.C.R. 129, 
[1998] S.C.J. 
No. 59 
Sublicernsing 
under a 
compulsory 
license 
Unanimous 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Merck Frosst 
Canada Ltd. v 
Canada 
(Health), 
[2012] 1 SCR 
23, 2012 SCJ 3 
Access to 
information 
under the 
Access to 
Information 
Act 
Majority 
with dissent 
6 0 0 0 1 3 
Shell Oil Co. v 
Canada 
(Commissioner 
of Patents), 
[1982] 2 SCR 
536 
Patentable 
subject matter 
– new use of 
an old dose is 
patentable if it 
is part of a new 
mixture 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 
Eastman Co., 
a division of 
Eastman 
Kodak Co. v 
Canada 
(Commissioner 
of Patents), 
[1974] SCR 
111 
Patentable 
subject matter 
– a new use for 
an old 
substance; use 
cannot be 
claimed 
separately 
from substance 
Unanimous 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Teva Canada 
Ltd v Pfizer 
Canada Inc., 
[2012] 3 SCR 
625 
Sufficiency of 
disclosure in 
patent 
specification 
Unanimous 
7 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
Whirlpool 
Corp. v 
Maytag Corp., 
[2000] 2 SCR 
1116 
Overlapping 
claims; 
obviousness 
Unanimous 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Whirlpool 
Corp. v Camco 
Inc., [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 1067  
Overlapping 
claims; 
obviousness 
Unanimous 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Monsanto 
Canada Inc. v 
Schmeiser, 
[2004] 1 SCR 
Patentable 
subject matter 
(genes, higher 
life forms); 
what is an 
Unanimous 
(first issue – 
see below 
for second 
issue);  
9 0 0 0 0 0 
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902, 2004 SCC 
34 
acceptable 
“use” 
Monsanto 
Canada Inc. v 
Schmeiser, 
[2004] 1 SCR 
902, 2004 SCC 
34 
Patent 
infringement 
of patents on 
simple life 
forms (genes) 
Majority 
with dissent 
(second 
issue) 
5 0 0 0 1 4 
Apotex Inc. v. 
Wellcome 
Foundation 
Ltd. [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 153, 
[2002] S.C.J. 
No. 78 
Standard of 
review; new 
use of an old 
compound 
 
Unanimous 
9 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
Apotex Inc. v. 
Sanofi-
Synthelabo 
Canada Inc. 
[2008] 3 SCR 
265, [2008] 
SCJ 63.   
 
Novelty, 
obviousness 
Unanimous 
7 
 
0 
 
0 0 0 0 
 
Sanofi-Aventis 
v. Apotex Inc 
SCC 20.   
Damages Unanimous 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Cases 30        
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Appendix 4: Proceeding by way of Judicial Review versus an Action for Infringement 
 
 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could offer correct 
determinations of patent validity if the summary proceeding was replaced with an 
infringement action by an amendment to section 6 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations.  This change would be particularly relevant if other evidence 
in this thesis supports the idea that judicial review provides an insufficient means of 
assessing patent validity.   
 However, section 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations states that a first person may “…apply to a court for an order…”311 which 
insinuates that the litigation proceed by way of application.  Sections 6(3) and 6(4) also 
refer to an application, in support of litigation originating as an application, which 
proceeds by way of summary. 
 Section 18.4(1) of the Federal Courts Act dictates that summary proceedings take 
place in a short period of time: “…an application or reference to the Federal Court under 
any of sections 18.1 to 18.3 shall be heard and determined without delay and in a 
summary way.”312  This part of the act explains why Part 5 of the Federal Court 
Regulations imposes strict time frames for the delivery of documents, pleas, 
examinations, cross-examinations, and affidavits to the court, and to the parties for 
summary proceedings.  But section 18.4(2) of the Federal Courts Act can facilitate the 
substitution of an action, and a subsequent complete trial, in place of a summary 
                                                          
311 Supra note 1, s 6(1).   
312Supra note 54, s 18.4(1).   
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proceeding: “The Federal Court may, if it considers it appropriate, direct that an 
application for judicial review be treated and proceeded with as an action.”313  
 The jurisprudence record demonstrates that the request for an Order of Prohibition 
does not proceed as an action for infringement.  In Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v 
Canada,314 the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that the sole purpose of litigation under 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is to decide whether a Notice 
of Compliance should issue as per the requirements laid out in the Food and Drug 
Regulations, and not whether patents are being infringed.  Therefore, formal decisions on 
patent infringement must be adjudicated separately, applying the rules of the Patent 
Act.315  However, it is interesting to note that Rouleau J. held previously in Bayer AG v 
Canada316 that “although the Regulations contemplate proceeding by way of judicial 
review, I am satisfied that it would be appropriate to direct that these applications 
proceed by way of an action in accordance with subsection 18.4(2) of the Federal Court 
Act.”317  This was in light of the fact that Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulation section 7(2)(b) refers to a declaration of the court, which had previously been 
interpreted as a declaration made by way of judicial review.318  Rouleau stated that this 
was not necessarily the case, since the effect of the Order of Prohibition was an 
interlocutory injunction over an extended period of time,319 and that such an extended 
                                                          
313 Supra note 54, s 18.4(2).   
314 [1994] FCJ 543, [1994] 55 CPR (3d) 1, at paras 5, 6.   
315 This usually happens through the Federal Court system, but can be initiated in any provincial 
jurisdiction.   
316 Bayer AG et al v Minister of National Health and Welfare [1993] FCJ 752, [1993] 51 CPR (3d) 87.   
317 Ibid at para 7.   
318 Rouleau quotes Judge McGillis, the motions judge, as making this statement June 8 and 10, 1993, in 
regards to a motion on the same case.  Section 7(2)(b) deals with the declaration of the court as to the 
validity of the patents in question.   
319 The order of prohibition was thirty months at that time, but has since been reduced to twenty-four 
months in an amendment in 1997.   
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period of time meant that making the decision could not necessarily be done in an 
expeditious fashion, and therefore not akin to a quick proceeding via judicial review.  He 
was therefore comfortable in ordering this case as an action.   
 However, in Huntley v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),320  
Pinard J. held that proceeding by way of action through section 18.4(2), the court “must 
find procedural or remedial inadequacies with the process of the underlying 
application.”321  In explaining the limited circumstances where an action is to be 
substituted for judicial review, Pinard J. summarized: 
It is, in general, only where facts of whatever nature cannot be satisfactorily 
established or weighed through affidavit evidence that consideration should be 
given to using subsection 18.4(2) of the Act. One should not lose sight of the clear 
intention of Parliament to have applications for judicial review determined 
whenever possible with as much speed and as little encumbrances and delays of 
the kind associated with trials as are possible. The "clearest of circumstances", to 
use the words of Muldoon J., where that subsection may be used, is where there is 
a need for viva voce evidence, either to assess demeanour and credibility of 
witnesses or to allow the Court to have a full grasp of the whole of the evidence 
whenever it feels the case cries out for the full panoply of a trial. [...]322 
 
The jurisprudence made by Pinard J. explains why proceedings arising out of the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations have been adjudicated via 
judicial review from the beginning.  Substituting judicial review for an action is reserved 
for specific cases where the credibility of witnesses is an issue, who need to be observed 
during cross-examination.323  Moving to a full trial process could achieve correctness 
with respect to patenting, and would allow witnesses to be examined and cross-examined 
                                                          
320 [2010] FCJ 497.   
321 Ibid at para 7.   
322 Huntley v Canada [2010] FCJ 497, [2010] FC 407.   
323 Viva voce evidence refers to evidence that is adduced in person, where the observation of the witness is 
deemed to be important in determining the credibility of the witness.   
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in person.324, 325  However, adjudicating generic approval disputes through a full trial as 
opposed to judicial review is only relevant if it is determined that the process of judicial 
review is inhibiting the proper evaluation of patent status.   
  
                                                          
324 Whether or not the credibility of expert witnesses is issue (or how much of an issue it is) with the current 
regulations, it is interesting to consider that the credibility of expert witnesses may need to be treated more 
seriously, and further research could reveal more about the nature of such testimony from scientific experts 
who are paid to pick a side and submit evidence.   
325 The focus for allowing for the substitution of an action, however, could have been on different 
“procedural or remedial inadequacies,” to demonstrate that deciding to include certain patents on the 
register was not reasonable, and that such an issue requires correctly determining the validity of patents.   
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Appendix Five: The Copyright Cases 
Case Issue Decision Standard of 
Review 
Entertainment Software 
Association v Society of 
Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of 
Canada [ESA]326 
Right to communicate 
the work to the public 
by telecommunication 
Majority 
judgment (2 sets) 
with minority 
dissent 
Correctness 
Rogers Communications 
Inc. v Society of 
Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of 
Canada [Rogers]327 
Right to communicate 
the work to the public 
by telecommunication 
Majority with 
Concurring 
Reasons 
Reasonableness  
Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Bell 
Canada [Bell]328 
User’s right of “fair 
dealing.” Do music 
previews fall within 
the category of 
“research” under 
s.29?  
Unanimous Reasonableness 
Alberta (Education) v 
Canadian Copyright 
Licensing Agency 
[Alberta(Education)]329 
User’s rights for 
educational 
institutions provided 
under the Copyright 
Act  
Majority with 
minority dissent 
Reasonableness 
Re: Sound v Motion Picture 
Theatre Associations of 
Canada [Re: Sound]330 
What is protected 
under the Copyright 
Act as “other subject 
matter”?  Is a 
soundtrack recording 
in a movie within the 
S.2 definition of 
“sound recording”? 
Unanimous Not specified 
Théberge v Galérie d’Art 
du Petit Champlain 
[Théberge]331 
Meaning of 
“reproduction” under 
the Copyright Act; 
moral rights 
Majority(4) with 
unanimous 
minority dissent 
(not solo – three 
dissenting judges) 
Reasonableness 
CCH Canadian Ltd v Law 
Society of Upper Canada 
[CCH]332 
Test for originality; 
statutory exceptions to 
“fair dealing” 
Unanimous  
                                                          
326 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231 [ESA]. 
327 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 283 [Rogers]. 
328 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 SCR 326 [Bell].  
329 2012 SCC 37, [2012] 2 SCR 345 [Alberta (Education)].  
330 2012 SCC 38, [2012] 2 SCR 376 [Re: Sound].   
331 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 [Théberge].   
332 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339 [CCH].  
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Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v 
Canadian Association of 
Internet Providers [SOCAN 
v CAIP]333 
Downloading of 
music online; 
transmission of music 
to one person – is it 
communication to the 
public? 
Majority with 
concurring 
reasons 
Correctness 
 
Robertson v Thomson Corp 
[Robertson]334 
Publication of an 
article from a 
collection of articles 
in a database 
constitutes a removal 
of that article from the 
context of a collection 
of works; rights not 
held by the owner of 
the database 
Majority (4) (two 
majority 
decisions) with 
unanimous 
minority dissent 
(not solo) 
 
Euro-Excellence Inc. v 
Kraft Canada Inc. 
[Toblerone]335 
Secondary 
infringement 
Majority with 
concurring 
reasons (2 sets) 
and minority 
dissent (not solo) 
 
Crookes v Newton 
[Crookes]336 
The context under 
which an article is 
written; meaning of 
“publication” with 
respect to the Internet 
environment 
Majority with 
concurring 
reasons and no 
dissent 
 
 
  
                                                          
333 2003 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 [SOCAN v CAIP].   
334 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 SCR 363 [Robertson].   
335 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 3 SCR 20 [Toblerone].  
336 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 [Crookes].   
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